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THE STATE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN EUROPE

ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ

This is the second edition of the annual *European Islamophobia Report (EIR)* which was presented for the first time in 2015. New countries are included in this year's *EIR*; while 25 countries were covered in 2015, the report for 2016 includes 27 country reports. *EIR 2016* is the result of 31 prominent scholars who specialise in different fields such as racism, gender and Islamophobia Studies. In the years to come we will attempt to include more countries in our report. Our final aim is to cover and monitor the developments of Islamophobia in all European countries.

Islamophobia has become a real danger to the foundations of democratic order and the values of the European Union. It has also become the main challenge to the social peace and coexistence of different cultures, religions and ethnicities in Europe. The country reports of *EIR 2016*, which cover almost all the European continent from Russia to Portugal and from Greece to Latvia, clearly show that the level of Islamophobia in fields such as education, employment, media, politics, the justice system and the Internet is on the rise. Since the publication of the last report there is little improvement. On the contrary, one can see from the country reports that the state of democracy and human rights in Europe is deteriorating. Islamophobia has become more real especially in the everyday lives of Muslims in Europe. It has surpassed the stage of being a rhetorical animosity and has become a physical animosity that Muslims feel in everyday life be it at school, the workplace, the mosque, transportation or simply on the street.

The refugee movement and the turmoil it has created in Europe, the unprecedented rise of far right parties all across the continent and the UK’s Brexit decision, which took many by surprise, have revealed the importance and relevance of this report, which covers incidents and developments in 2016. The short-term political significance of Islamophobia is as much relevant as Islamophobia’s structural dimension. As mentioned before, small successes can be witnessed in some European countries yet great challenges lie ahead for deepening the values of human rights and freedom of religion in Europe.
The Rise of Islamophobia

As a survey conducted by the Chatham House Europe Programme shows, public opposition to any further migration from predominantly Muslim states is by no means confined to Trump’s administration (implementation of the ‘Muslim-Ban’). Respondents in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK were presented with the statement ‘All further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped’. As the report reveals, the majorities in all but two of the ten states agreed to this statement, ranging from 71% in Poland, 65% in Austria, 53% in Germany and 51% in Italy to 47% in the United Kingdom and 41% in Spain. In no country did the percentage that disagreed surpass 32%.1

The findings of this report go hand in hand with similar surveys on this topic. The Ipsos Perils of Perception Survey 2016 found that the current and the future Muslim population in Europe are enormously overestimated in most countries. Out of the list of all 20 countries where respondents overestimated the Muslim population by more than 10%, 12 are European, while the USA and Canada are among the remaining 8 countries. When asked “Now thinking about 2020, out of every 100 people, about how many do you think will be Muslim?”, the top 20 countries where proponents overestimated the Muslim population again were in majority European (11). The average guess in France is that 40% of

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the population will be Muslim in 2020 when the actual projection is 8.3%. Italy comes third with 26% overestimation, and Belgium and Germany fourth with 24% overestimation.\(^3\)

Connecting this to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, we can suggest that this overestimation is connected to unfavourable views regarding Muslims. The report states,

“Opinions of Muslims vary considerably across Europe. Half or more in Hungary, Italy, Poland, Greece and Spain have a very or somewhat unfavorable view of Muslims. And in Italy (36%), Hungary (35%) and Greece (32%), roughly a third hold very unfavorable opinions. Majorities in the other nations surveyed express positive attitudes about Muslims. Nonetheless, at least a quarter in each country have negative views of Muslims.”\(^4\)

These numbers are not shocking if we look at the incidents of Islamophobia and its pervasiveness in power structure across Europe. Muslims are seen as the enemy ‘within’. There is wide consent in Western societies to Muslims not being seen as equal citizens. Othering and differential treatment may also overlap with the dehumanization of Muslims. Thus, physical attacks and political restrictions can often be carried out and even defended in an atmosphere of wide distrust and enmity. Islamophobia is by no means confined to the working poor or the middle class, who have been misinformed about Islam and Muslims. It is especially true for the so-called educated elite. Discriminating policies like the ban of the hijab for certain professions, the ban of the niqab in public, bans of minarets and other laws restricting Muslim’s freedom of religion speak volumes. If politicians can take such decisions and the media, along with large parts of society, accept them, why should we wonder about the strong opposition to immigration of Muslim people in Europe?

Hence, these numbers reveal the necessity of the EIR, which looks at the challenge of Islamophobia from a qualitative and not a quantitative research perspective. Its aim is to document and analyse trends in the spread of Islamophobia in various European nation states. There cannot be a claim of full comprehensiveness, since European nation states by majority still lack data collection. Hence, a central recommendation of the EIR is that Islamophobia or anti-Muslim hate crime should be included as a category in European nation states’ statistics – a development that has not occurred as of yet. The EIR’s primary contribution is to reveal the tendencies of Islamophobia and to give representative examples of its overall unfolding in the investigated states.

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Recognition of Islamophobia

There are various definitions of Islamophobia. However, the definition of Islamophobia used by the EIR, as defined by its editors, is as follows,

“When talking about Islamophobia, we mean anti-Muslim racism. As Anti-Semitism Studies has shown, the etymological components of a word do not necessarily point to its complete meaning, nor how it is used. Such is also the case with Islamophobia Studies. Islamophobia has become a well-known term used in academia as much as in the public sphere. Criticism of Muslims or of the Islamic religion is not necessarily Islamophobic. Islamophobia is about a dominant group of people aiming at seizing, stabilising and widening their power by means of defining a scapegoat – real or invented – and excluding this scapegoat from the resources/rights/definition of a constructed ‘we’. Islamophobia operates by constructing a static ‘Muslim’ identity, which is attributed in negative terms and generalised for all Muslims. At the same time, Islamophobic images are fluid and vary in different contexts, because Islamophobia tells us more about the Islamophobe than it tells us about the Muslims/Islam”.

We think that with this definition, we clearly address many of the suspicions, which are put against the term as such. As a matter of fact, while supranational institutions such as the OSCE embrace the terminology Anti-Semitism, the OSCE still refuses to use Islamophobia, which we see as part of the problem. Again, we recommend that Islamophobia/anti-Muslim Racism or anti-Muslim hate crime should be included in the collection of “equality data” in all European states. Institutions such as the OSCE need to establish solid monitoring and recording mechanisms for discrimination, hate crime and hate speech towards Muslims. In order to have reliable data, it has to be segregated by bias/category and also segregated by gender. This is even more problematic in countries that do not allow collection of data on religion or race. This seemingly egalitarian approach in reality hides the discrimination of Muslims. Also, response mechanisms seem to be unclear and not adequately used. When there is an incident of discrimination/hate crime/hate speech, there are different response mechanisms available, yet, none of these are familiar to the vast majority of Muslim citizens of European countries. Thus, we recommend that response mechanisms should be made more available, accessible and clear. Last but not least, an empowerment of the Muslim community is needed to strengthen critical citizenship and help European states deepen their democracies.

Policy Recommendations for European Countries

The authors of every respective national report have suggested specific recommendations regarding the country they have covered. The following list of recommendations serves to underscore some of these recommendations and to add some additional suggestions on the supranational level.

We think it is important for civil society to understand that Islamophobia is a problem of institutional racism. The illusion that Europe is a post-racial society prevents large parts of European societies from recognising the severe challenge of Islamophobia to local societies. The focus has to shift from Muslims’ actions to those of European societies. Racism, including Islamophobia, tells us more about the racists than about their imagined scapegoat or their victims. Hence, Islamophobia reveals aspects of Europe and the internal problems European societies continue to face. A recognition and a critical consciousness of this societal disease is of utmost importance to be able to create more just societies in Europe. At the same time, Muslims must be allowed to enjoy their spaces of freedom like other dominant religious and political groups in European societies without being securitised or criminalised. The securitisation of Islam, especially policies countering violent extremism and their impact on the freedom of religion of belief for Muslims, and even freedom of movement or free assembly have to be challenged by all democratic forces in Europe. Communities must be consulted and human rights frameworks must be respected. National security is not among the criteria that should permit the limitation of freedom of religion or belief.

We especially urge politicians to speak out against Islamophobia as one of the most pressing forms of racism in our days. Europe needs more courageous politicians who do not only challenge the politics of right-wing populist parties, but also challenge institutionalised forms of racism targeting Muslims in the fields of employment, education, state bureaucracy, and media. We also call for journalists and editors to challenge Islamophobic reporting in their news media and give space to more balanced views. Generally, the issue of religious literacy is a huge problem that does not only concern media but also the police, prosecutors and civil servants. We see that people simply lack basic knowledge on Islam and Muslims’ practices. We see a need for the introduction of more comparative religion courses, or religious teaching, in a formal and informal educational setting.

We see that Muslim women are among the most vulnerable direct victims of Islamophobia. ENAR has conducted a report on the impact of Islamophobia on Muslim women and presented 37 recommendations, which we can only underscore given the findings of our report. Women who are visibly Muslim are socially ostracised in many places. The combination of internal community prob-

lems, discrimination (education and employment) and hate crimes against Muslim women (data shows that it is 70% more likely for a Muslim woman to be attacked in the street) are leaving their horrible mark on Muslim women. Hence, the protection and the empowerment of Muslim women have to be on the central agenda of states and NGOs. The ruling of the European Court of Justice regarding Esma Bougnaoui’s dismissal by a French company for wearing a hijab when dealing with clients as unlawful discrimination is an important step towards equality and an anti-discriminatory society.\(^7\) At the same time, the case of Belgian Samira Achbita vs. Belgium, where it was argued that a dismissal due to the headscarf would be permissible against the backdrop of a general prohibition of all outward signs of political, philosophical and religious beliefs exhibited by employees in the workplace, is worrying and challenges the reality of a diverse Europe.\(^8\)

\(^7\) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/world/europe/france-head-scarf-court.html?_r=0
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Executive Summary

In spite of the insistent claim that there is no Islamophobia in Portugal, discriminatory stereotyping of Muslims is widespread. Attitudes towards Islam, Muslims and Islamophobia are informed by the colonial past of the country, its history of recent dictatorship, as well as incidents in other countries. Portugal’s very small and diverse Muslim community has proactive representatives who are well-versed in working with the media. A significant part of the community is economically secure and well connected with church dignitaries and the highest-ranking state officials. Interfaith activities count on the presence of these dignitaries. High-ranking governmental representatives and political parties do not exploit anti-Muslim stereotypes in their election campaigns. Nevertheless, Muslims are repeatedly exposed to stereotyping and processes of Othering.

Muslim institutions like mosques are more readily accepted in Portugal than in other European countries. Nevertheless, they become targets of hostile acts in the aftermath of terror attacks abroad. Their representatives are repeatedly confronted with anti-Muslim stereotypes and defamation in cyberspace. Schoolbooks and the media play a crucial role in the definition of a white and Roman Catholic “Portugueseness” or “Europeanness” and related mechanisms of exclusion.

While police violence and exclusion predominantly affect the black and Romani populations, intersectional discrimination of black Muslims as well as intersection with gender and poverty has not been analysed and recorded systematically. Muslims affected by multiple aspects of discrimination and exclusion are not visible in the media.

Anti-Muslim actions and incidents occur in Portugal, but there are no mechanisms in place to register and document them.
Resumo

Apesar da afirmação insistente de que não existe islâmofobia em Portugal, os estereótipos discriminatórios sobre muçulmanos são generalizados. A postura em relação ao Islã, aos muçulmanos e à islâmofobia são baseadas no passado colonial do país, na sua história recente de ditadura e em incidentes em outros países. Portugal tem uma comunidade muçulmana muito pequena e diversa a qual conta com representantes proativos e versados no trabalho com a mídia. Uma parte significativa da comunidade está em boa situação financeira e bem conectada com dignitários da igreja e com altos funcionários do Estado. As atividades inter-religiosas contam com a presença desses dignitários. Os representantes governamentais de alto escalão e partidos políticos não usam estereótipos anti-muçulmanos para campanhas eleitorais. No entanto, os muçulmanos são repetidamente expostos a estereótipos e alteridade.

Instituições muçulmanas como as mesquitas são mais facilmente aceitas em Portugal do que em outros países europeus. No entanto, tornaram-se alvos de atos hostis após ataques terroristas no exterior. Seus representantes são repetidamente confrontados com estereótipos anti-muçulmanos e difamação no espaço cibernético. Livros escolares e meios de comunicação desempenham um papel crucial na definição de uma “portuguesidade” e “europeidade” branca e católica e os mecanismos de exclusão associados a esse processo.

Embora a violência e a exclusão da polícia afetem predominantemente a população negra e cigana, a discriminação interseccional de muçulmanos negros, bem como a interseção com gênero e pobreza não foram analisadas e registradas sistematicamente. Os muçulmanos afetados por múltiplos aspectos de discriminação e exclusão não são visíveis na mídia.
Introduction

When requiring about Islamophobia in Portugal, the recurrent answer is that it does not exist. In fact, research on any form of racism in Portugal poses several challenges. Portugal has traditionally been at the periphery of Europe and the European Union, the country has a longstanding tradition of distancing itself from Spain, and a strong orientation towards its former colonies.¹ Portugal's population suffers from high levels of internal inequality, e.g. its Gini coefficient has remained at a stable high 0.34 since 2011.²

Since the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and the subsequent economic crisis, emigration has remained high. Estimations range from 50,000 emigrants per year³ to up to 150,000.⁴ At the same time, immigration has decreased significantly.

Colonial politics and discourses continue to influence national perceptions about religion, racism, and European or Portuguese identity. During the first period of colonial politics of the Estado Novo, i.e. from the early 1930s to 1951, the Salazar regime aimed at anchoring the idea of a supposed superiority of the “white race” and European civilisation in all parts of the population, as well as the duty to “civilise” and Christianise the (remaining) colonised territories.⁵ This ideology and policy of “colonial consciousness” was changed in 1951 when Portugal’s regime decided to eliminate the word “colonies” from its terminology and to substitute it with “oversee provinces”. As a way to counter criticism for maintaining its colonies in Africa, Portugal described itself as a “pluri-continental” and “pluri-racial” nation, stressed national unity,⁶ and resorted to the ideology of lusotropicalism.⁷ The turn towards an ideology of “no-racism” implied that racism was projected on other people, especially Europeans from the North.⁸ Lusotropicalism influenced Portugal’s policies until the end of the regime and the independence of its colonies in 1974; and it continues to influence Portuguese discourses on racism.⁹

⁶. Ibid., p. 79.
⁷. Ibid., p. 74.
⁸. Ibid., p. 72.
⁹. Ibid., p. 85.
Similarly, the perception of Islam in the colonies changed in the 1960s. Before the colonial wars, colonial functionaries perceived Islam and Muslims as unmanageable and menacing; being a Muslim was repeatedly described as incompatible with being Portuguese. In Mozambique, Muslim Indians were considered a specific threat to Portuguese sovereignty. By the end of the 1960s, official policies changed and Muslims were considered as possible allies to maintain rule and order in the colonies. Changes within the Catholic Church, notably the Second Vatican Council and its new openness towards other creeds, favoured the new Portuguese policy. In the European mainland, however, the Estado Novo continued to scrutinise Muslim leaders.

Portugal’s Muslim community is very small. Its origin goes back to the 1950s when students of South Asian origin arrived from Mozambique. In 1968, the Comunidade Islamica de Lisboa was founded by 25 to 30 members. After the independence wars and the end of the Salazar regime, half a million refugees from the ex-colonies came to Portugal, a fraction of them Muslims. Today, estimates of the Muslim population oscillate between 35,000 and 55,000. Most of the Portuguese Muslims originate from Mozambique, and among them, the largest group is of South Asian origin. The second largest group is from Guinea and of both South Asian and African origin. In the 1980s and 1990s, smaller groups of Muslims arrived from North Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Most of Portugal’s Muslims are Sunnis, and the second largest group is Sevener Shi’a Ismailis. The group’s presence is mainly the result of collective migration by the predominantly Gujarati Ismaili community in Mozambique, and it is well connected with Ismaili communities in Canada and other European countries.

Several studies show that prejudices and discrimination against Muslims are weaker in Portugal than in other European countries, but they are nevertheless widespread. Already before 9/11, prejudices against Muslims were significantly more widespread than against (other) migrants. Among 30 European countries, Portugal had the lowest percentage of people unwilling to have Muslims as neighbours (8.11%) and of people unwilling to have immigrants as neighbours.

11. Ibid. p. 43f.
12. Ibid. p. 51f.
16. About 5,000 to 7,000, according to Soares Loja (2002: 193) or 8,000 according to Mapril & Tiesler (2013: 517.
In a representative study conducted during summer 2010, more than a third of those interviewed in Portugal described their personal attitude towards Muslims as “negative” or “very negative”;\(^\text{19}\) 57.9% associated Islam with the discrimination of women; 54.3% with fanaticism; 39.4% with propensity to violence; and 42.9% with narrow-mindedness. Positive associations were much less common and included peacefulness (19.8%), tolerance (17.6%), respect of human rights (17.1%) and solidarity (27.4%).\(^\text{20}\) The approval of the construction of mosques and minarets in Portugal is significantly higher than in other European countries (73.5% and 53.4% respectively). While 39.4% consider other cultures and religions as a threat to their country, 81.1% also consider increasing cultural diversity as a form of societal enrichment; 89.2% consider that all religious affiliations in the country should have the same rights; 41.6% agree that girls should be allowed to wear a headscarf at school; and 36.5% consider that Islam fits well into the Western world.\(^\text{21}\) In 2011, nearly half of the population of Portugal considered that Muslim culture and European Culture were not compatible (49.9%), more than 25% considered that there were too many Muslims in Portugal, and 34.4% considered that Muslims demanded too much.\(^\text{22}\) Finally, 45% of the population believed in a “natural hierarchy” between black and white people.\(^\text{23}\)

**Significant Incidents and Developments**

The Ismaili community has opted for transferring the global seat of their imamat to Portugal. The corresponding agreement between the Republic of Portugal and the Ismaili Imamat was signed in November 2015. At the ceremony, Portugal’s Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho and other senior government officials were present.\(^\text{24}\) Subsequently, the Aga Khan Foundation has chosen Lisbon as its world headquarters.\(^\text{25}\)


\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 6.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 8-10.


\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 201.


After months of political instability, conservative Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa gained presidency with 52% of the votes on 24 January. In February 2016, Portugal offered to accept thousands of refugees from Greece. Tito Morais, head of the Portuguese Refugee Council, argued that the refugees might benefit regions in Portugal that have been deserted by emigration.26

The past year has seen increasing research and activism against racism in Portugal focusing on racism against people of African descent and the Romani minority. Police violence against black youth is a recurrent topic27 and was also condemned by the Islamic Human Rights Commission in London.28 The UN Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent had stated earlier that “the rate at which people of African descent were killed by the police in Portugal was higher than any other country of the European Union”.29

Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and Discursive Events

In spite of the relatively high acceptance of visible Muslim sights, threats of violence against mosques in Portugal are regularly reported in the aftermath of violent attacks committed by Muslims in other Western countries.30 In 2016, this included a gathering in front of the Mesquita Central de Lisboa against Islam in the aftermath of the suicide attack at the airport Brussels-Zaventem. The police was present and neighbours of the mosque told the protesters to leave.31 Since Muslims are not considered to be victims of anti-Muslim racism, there are no institutions which document relevant Islamophobic incidents.

Employment

The economic situation of Muslims tends to reflect their position before immigration to Portugal. Muslims of South Asian origin who came from Mozambique to Portugal tend to have middle-class backgrounds; their descendants predominantly work in

the commercial and banking fields and trade. Similarly, Muslims from Guinea-Bis-
sau tended to come as students and succeeded in establishing themselves as pro-
fessionals. Members of the Ismaili community tend to be the most affluent and are successful businessmen and -women in the areas of interior design, restaurants, furniture, clothing, the hotel sector, banking, services, real estate, and caregiving. Younger generations are starting to enter law, engineering and medical professions.

Already before the economic crisis, one third of the community – especially the black African minority and recent immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia - were living in poverty and working in the construction sector.

An investigation in 2010 did not provide evidence on restrictions imposed on Muslim employees in relation to the practice of their religion.

A recent report suggests that prejudice against Muslims families limits their possibilities to access social services. In a demonstrative example, a woman from Tapada das Mercês complained that her wish to combat poverty was rendered impossible because the responsible social worker focused on denouncing her husband as the culprit of - non-existing - domestic violence instead of supporting her in solving the dire socioeconomic situation of her family. The social worker argued that domestic violence “is a problem with Muslim families”. In Portugal, Muslim men, as evidenced in this case, tend to be associated with “violent behaviour” while Muslim women are readily considered to be victims of domestic violence.

Education

In science, representatives of Muslim communities co-operate at the highest level with representatives of the state. On 12 May, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of the Portuguese Republic and the Ismaili Imamat signed an Agreement of Cooperation to strengthen research capacity and to improve the quality of life in Portugal and in Portuguese-speaking countries, particularly countries in Africa. The Ismaili Imamat will support these efforts with a grant of 10 million Euro over 10 years.
Portugal’s tradition of justifying colonialism, slavery and related racism in history schoolbooks has been analysed in recent years. In the case of slavery, any mentioning of racism is avoided and Portugal’s role is trivialised by referring to “Arabs” – i.e. Muslims – as slave traders. The entanglement of concepts of Europeanness, modernity, racism and slavery and their consequences on the present are neglected. Racist descriptions of Africa and Africans as well as justifications of colonialism are recurrent. Similarly, the description of European history imparts stereotyped perceptions of supposed “Europeanness”, tends to equate [white] Portugal and Europe with Western Europe’s Roman Catholic Church, and introduces the unchallenged concept of Muslims as threatening and as a people.

In 2016, state representatives claimed that in national history books, the word descoberta (discovery) has been replaced by the term expansão (expansion) and that in a colouring book and pencil project children were exposed to different skin tones represented by the colouring pencils. It is questionable, however, whether such superficial changes have been accompanied by structural changes questioning relations of power and racism.

Politics
On 9 March, Marcelo Rebeldo de Sousa was sworn in as the new president of Portugal. The very same day he participated at an interfaith ceremony in the Mosque of Lisbon and underlined his commitment as a defender of religious freedom in all its expressions.

On 5 September, 2016, the state’s Commission of Religious Freedom held a high-ranking conference on “Religious pluralism and citizenship”. The conference was attended by high-ranking officials of the government and religious leaders and was opened by the Minister of Justice. In his inaugural speech, José de Sousa e Brito, co-author of the Religious Freedom Act, justice emeritus of the Constitutional Court in Lisbon and visiting professor at the Universidade Nova in Lisbon, commented on the relation between the Catholic creed and Islam. While he stressed that “Muslims have the

39. Ibid., p. 166.
41. One school book cited by Araújo and Rodriguez Maeso describes three “attacking peoples” that threatened Europe between the 7th and the 10th century: “the Muslims, the Normans and the Hungarians” (ibid., p. 10).
43. Ibid., p. 7
44. Comissão da Liberdade Religiosa.
fundamental right not to be discriminated against”, 45 he did not object to descriptions of Islam – also “European Islam” – as a “problem” and as inferior to the Catholic creed, and he did not counter assumptions of a supposed danger of a Muslim invasion. The Declaration for Dialogue, Religious Tolerance and Peace signed by 21 representatives from a broad variety of religious communities, however, underlines that the foundation for interfaith dialogue is the recognition of the equality of different creeds.46

Media
The representation of Muslims in the Portuguese media has changed with time and has been closely related to political and economic developments. The emphasis on close and positive relations with Arab countries during the oil crisis47 was replaced by more hostile images during the Gulf War of 1990/91 and extensive agreement in the media with Huntington’s thesis of a “clash of civilizations”. By the end of 1993, “terrorism was styled as militant and revolutionary Islam”.48 Von Kemnitz’s analysis underlines that with short exceptions, “Portuguese Muslims often fall victim of biased concepts inherited from the past and contemporary international affairs. They can be detected in many comparisons made although there is no direct relationship between the cause and the comment. (...) In all these cases it is clear that the inheritance of the past, tributary to the spirit of the Reconquista and the Crusades is still prevailing”.49

The Religious Freedom Act opened new spaces as it guarantees broadcasting time to religious communities.50

At present, media reports concerning Islam or Muslims focus extensively on terrorist acts committed by Muslims. Reports of Islamophobia in other European countries, especially Germany and France, are repeatedly publicised. Reports on Muslims in Portugal tend to focus on activities at the Mesquita Central de Lisboa and on the Ismaili community. Several of these media reports reflect anti-Muslim stereotypes.

Repeated terrorist attacks serve as trigger events to increase a charged atmosphere, also in reporting, as this illustrative example shows: in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on Paris’ Charlie Hebdo, the headline of an article summarising the position of the imam of the Mesquita Central de Lisboa reads “Those who are not

48. Ibid., p. 14f.
49. Ibid., p. 21.
satisfied with living in a liberal country are free to emigrate”. A year and a half later and after the terrorist attack at a church in Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray, a longer and more elaborated message of the imam is summarised with the headline “A Muslim is not satisfied: So he should emigrate and leave us in peace with the discourse of hate”. In his discourse imam David Munir also refers to “problems of integration” of young Muslims in other European countries and stresses that Muslims in Europe are European Muslims. The complete quote from which the headline is extracted states “If a Muslim, whether he is born or not in Europe, is not satisfied with the freedom he was given, if he is not satisfied with the country where he lives, so he should emigrate, he should go to a different country where he can feel more fulfilled”. While the statement of the imam also refers to problematic societal structures in other European countries, the headline and the illustration of the text are significantly more sinister than in 2015.

In 2015 and 2016, Imam David Munir gained the attention of the media due to an alleged case of domestic violence. The reports, which still available on the Internet, do not respect the basic rule of law that a person has to be considered innocent until proven otherwise. One columnist called the alleged incident “an Islamic elbow strike” and exploited the news for disseminating anti-Muslim prejudice. The closing of the case in April 2016 due to lack of evidence has not gained the same public media coverage on the Internet, and non-violence was not related to Islam. In December 2016, more than half a year after the acquittal, the YouTube Canal M&CM uploaded a vilifying report about the accusation and describes domestic violence as inherent in Islam. Similarly, on 4 June, two months after the acquittal, “Alfonso do Portugal” posted a video on YouTube opposing the imam’s visit to a girls’ school, insulting the imam and accusing him of indoctrinating the girls.

While this discriminatory reporting did not enter the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) report procedure, it underlines

55. It was reported in the printed journal Correiro on April 5, 2016.
CERD’s concern about “the persistence of racist hate speech and behaviour (…) particularly against persons belonging to minorities, notably Roma, Muslims, Africans/people of African descent as well as migrants. The Committee is also concerned about the limited information provided on measures taken to prosecute and punish such acts.”

Justice System
The Religious Freedom Act was passed by Parliament on 26 April, 2001, and significantly improved the legal status of religious minorities. Before the act’s enforcement, religious communities other than the Catholic Church could only be recognised as “associations in private law”. The Religious Freedom Act guarantees the same tax regulations for all recognised religious communities and the right to religious instruction at schools. Under the Religious Freedom Act the state recognises marriages according to the rites of the respective religion as legal marriages when the partners decide to combine civil and religious ceremonies. Equal access to spiritual assistance is guaranteed for Muslim soldiers, patients and inmates; however, administrative procedures make access to prisons difficult. Before the passing of the act, parents had to select the names of their children from lists approved by the government. The Religious Freedom Act includes the right of students to observe religious holidays and, in a more restricted way, guarantees the same right to employees.

In contradiction to the Religious Freedom Act, in 2010, 19.4% of the population considered that the practice of Muslim faith had to be restricted significantly.

There are no restrictions on the headscarf, the burkini or any other clothing related to Islam or other religions in Portugal.

Internet
In addition to already mentioned films posted on YouTube, websites spreading anti-Muslim stereotypes include amigodeisrael.blogspot.de, maquinazero.wordpress.

61. Ibid., p. 198.
During 2015 and 2016, an Internet petition circulated against the construction of a mosque in Mouraria, Lisbon. Up to this time, the petition has been signed by 6,678 persons. Among other reasons, the petition argues that the construction would “contribute to social alarm, taking into consideration the expansionism of Islamic extremism in the Middle East and North Africa which threatens Portugal, since at the moment we know that there exist radical Muslims who strive for the integration of the Iberian peninsula into a great Islamic caliphate”.65

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

While Portuguese Muslims and non-Muslims tend to insist that there is no Islamophobia in Portugal, stereotyping of Muslims is widespread and has a long historical tradition. The perception of Muslims as non-Portuguese, non-European and therefore inferior and potentially dangerous is deeply rooted in the country’s precolonial and colonial history. Similarly, the perception of racism as an “imported” problem echoes late colonial discourses.

Political parties in Portugal do not exploit anti-Muslim stereotypes in their election campaigns, and representatives of Muslim communities and the government co-operate at the highest level. This symbolic recognition is of crucial importance for the peaceful coexistence of a diverse population.

The analysis of schoolbooks however shows that euphemizing the colonial past and homogenizing constructions of “Europeanness” and “Portuguese identity” as white and Roman Catholic continue to prevail.

Portuguese media report critically on anti-Muslim racism in other countries. At the same time, when referring to members of the Portuguese Muslim population, media tend to replicate stereotypes and engage in processes of Oth"er-ing (e.g. presenting Muslim men as violent and inclined to domestic violence, or Muslims as incapable of having humour, etc.). Anti-Muslim racism on the Internet goes unpunished even when defamations clearly contradict basic notions of the rule of law.

Systematic information about anti-Muslim harassment or protests is not available, as there is no NGO or institution that collects information about such incidents systematically.

Governmental institutions and NGOs should join forces to implement CERD’s recommendation to “intensify the efforts to raise the awareness of public, civil servants and law enforcement officials of the importance of cultural diversity and inter-

ethnic understanding in order to combat stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination against refugees, migrants, Roma, Muslims, and Africans people of African descent”.66

Legal measures against hate speech and defamation on the Internet should be further developed and proactively made known and accessible to representatives of Muslim communities as well as local associations.

Journalists and interviewers should receive specific training to reflect their role and responsibility in processes of Othering and stereotyping.

Schoolbooks and curricula should be revised in order to recognise the historical multicultural and multireligious tradition of Portugal as well as the legacy of colonialism and racism, and the related privileges of the majority population.

Special attention should be given to research, documentation and action in favour of people affected by intersectional discrimination, i.e., black, poor and female Muslims.

Chronology

• **19 February**: Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa offers to relocate refugees as an act of solidarity with Greece.

• **7 March**: The Portuguese government gives the green light for the acquisition of the Henrique Mendonça House by the Aga Khan Foundation in order to serve as the new Ismaili world headquarters.

• **9 March**: Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa is sworn in as the new president of Portugal. The same day he participates at an interfaith ceremony in the Mosque of Lisbon and presents himself as a defender of religious freedom in all its expressions.67

• **12 May**: The Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education of the Portuguese Republic and the Ismaili Imamat sign an Agreement of Cooperation.

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66. CERD, “Concluding observations on the fifteenth to seventeenth periodic reports of Portugal CERD/C/PRT/ CO/15-17,” p. 4.

This is the second issue of the annual *European Islamophobia Report (EIR)* which was presented for the first time in 2015. New countries are included in this year's EIR; while 25 countries were covered in 2015, the report for 2016 includes 27 country reports. *EIR 2016* is the result of 31 prominent scholars who specialise in different fields such as racism, gender and Islamophobia Studies.

Islamophobia has become a real danger to the foundations of democratic order and the values of the European Union. It has also become the main challenge to the social peace and coexistence of different cultures, religions and ethnicities in Europe. The country reports of *EIR 2016*, which cover almost all the European continent from Russia to Portugal and from Greece to Latvia, clearly show that the level of Islamophobia in fields such as education, employment, media, politics, the justice system and the Internet is on the rise. Since the publication of the last report there is little improvement. On the contrary, one can see from the country reports that the state of democracy and human rights in Europe is deteriorating. Islamophobia has become more real especially in the everyday lives of Muslims in Europe. It has surpassed the stage of being a rhetorical animosity and has become a physical animosity that Muslims feel in everyday life be it at school, the workplace, the mosque, transportation or simply on the street.

**About SETA**

Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) is a non-profit research institute based in Turkey dedicated to innovative studies on national, regional and international issues. SETA is the leading think tank in Turkey and has offices in Ankara, Istanbul, Washington D.C. and Cairo. The objective of SETA is to produce up-to-date and accurate knowledge and analyses in the fields of politics, economy, and society, and inform policy makers and the public on changing political, economic, social, and cultural conditions. Through research reports, publications, brain storming sessions, conferences and policy recommendations, SETA seeks to guide leaders in government, civil society, and business, and contributes to informed decision making mechanisms.