By gathering 39 local scholars, experts, and civil society activists specialized in racism and human rights, the fourth edition of the European Islamophobia Report addresses a still timely and politically important issue. All 34 country reports included in this book follow a unique structure that is convenient, first, for comparing country reports and, second, for selected readings on a particular topic such as politics, employment, or education with regards to Islamophobia across Europe.

The present report investigates in detail the underlying dynamics that directly or indirectly support the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Europe. This extends from Islamophobic statements spread in national media to laws and policies that restrain the fundamental rights of European Muslim citizens. As a result, the European Islamophobia Report 2018 discusses the impact of anti-Muslim discourse on human rights, multiculturalism, and the state of law in Europe.

This fourth edition of our report highlights how European societies are challenged by the rise of violent far-right groups that do not only preach hatred of Muslims but also participate in the organization of bloody terror attacks. The rise of far-right terrorist groups such as AFO (Action of Operational Forces) in France or the network Hannibal in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland confirms EUROPOL’s alarming surveys on the growing danger of right-wing terrorism.

This year, SETA worked in cooperation with the Leopold Weiss Institute, an Austrian NGO based in Vienna dedicated to the research of Muslims in Europe. In addition, the European Union has funded the European Islamophobia Report 2018 through the program “Civil Society Dialogue Between EU and Turkey (CSD-V)”.

About SETA
Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) is a non-profit research institute based in Turkey dedicated to innovative studies on national, regional and international issues. SETA is the leading think tank in Turkey and has offices in Ankara, Istanbul, Washington D.C. and Cairo. The objective of SETA is to produce up-to-date and accurate knowledge and analyses in the fields of politics, economy, and society, and inform policy makers and the public on changing political, economic, social, and cultural conditions. Through research reports, publications, brainstorming sessions, conferences and policy recommendations, SETA seeks to guide leaders in government, civil society, and business, and contributes to informed decision making mechanisms.
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**Disclaimer:** Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the *European Islamophobia Report* are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression of the editors or the funding institutions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Directororate for EU Affairs.

Executive Summary

Almost 65,000 Muslims live in Romania accounting for 0.34% of the total population. The presence and integration of Muslims in Romania remains, as with immigration as a whole, a marginal issue on the political and public agenda. Although no significant incidents regarding Muslims and immigrants have been recorded in Romania during 2018, hostility and increasing anti-immigrant rhetoric in the public sphere has been present, especially in the context of the debate regarding the adoption of the UN Global Compact for Migration.

Romania’s initial endorsement of the UN Global Compact for Migration generated criticism from politicians, sparked small protests organised by far-right movements, and increased the use of bombastic headlines, factual misrepresentations, and stereotypical depictions of immigrants and Muslims in media coverage.

During 2018, Islamophobic and anti-immigrant articles and campaigns were recorded, especially in nationalist and Christian Orthodox media outlets. Activities in cyberspace of anti-Islam activists and sympathisers of extremist political parties continued to spread hate speech directed at Muslims, although to a lesser extent than in previous years. In February 2018, the National Council for Combatting Discrimination ruled that the statements and actions of a professor from the University of Bucharest against persons who wear Islamic veils in public institutions (such as universities) amount to discrimination, limit the right to education, and infringe the right to dignity, and issued a fine for RON 2,000 (about EUR 430).1

Hate crimes and cases of incitement to hatred remain underreported. Few official complaints have been made compared to the large number of people reportedly experiencing incidents of racial/ethnic or religious discrimination. Still, there is no systemic data collection regarding hate crimes and other types of violence directed at immigrants or Muslims by the Romanian authorities.

The most significant development affecting Muslims during the reporting period was the rejection by the Chamber of Deputies of the legislative proposal to ban face covering with any material that prevents physiognomic recognition in educational institutions. At the time of writing this report, the proposal was up for review in the Senate.

Sumar

Aproape 65.000 de musulmani trăiesc în România, reprezentând 0,34% din totalul populației. Prezența și integrarea musulmanilor în România rămâne, ca și în cazul imigrației în ansamblu, o problemă marginală pe agenda politică și publică. Deși în anul 2018 în România nu s-au înregistrat incidente semnificative cu privire la musulmani și imigranți, în sfera publică a fost totuși prezentă ostilitatea și retorica anti-imigrație, în special în contextul dezbaterii privind adoptarea Pactului Global ONU pentru o migrație sigură, ordonată și reglementată.

Susținerea inițială acordată de România Pactului Global ONU pentru o migrație sigură, ordonată și reglementată, a generat critici din partea politicienilor, a declanșat mici proteste organizate de mișcări de extremă dreaptă și a sporit folosirea în mass-media a titlurilor bombastice, a denaturării faptelor și reprezentările stereotipice ale imigranților și musulmanilor.

În decursul anului 2018 au fost sesizate articole și campanii islamofobe și anti-imigrație, în special în mass-media naționalistă și creștin ortodoxă. În spațiul cibernetic, activiștii anti-Islam și simpatizanții partidelor politice extremist au continuat să răspândească discursul instigator la ură față de musulmani, desi într-o maniera reduză comparativ cu anii anterioiri.

Infracțiunile motivele de ură și cazurile de incitare la ură rămân insuficient raportate. Au fost făcute puține plângeri oficiale în comparație cu numărul mare de persoane care susțin că se confruntă cu incidente de discriminare rasială / etnică sau religioasă. În plus, la nivelul autoritatilor nu există un sistem unitar de colectare a datorilor privind infracțiunile motivele de ură și alte tipuri de violență îndreptate împotriva imigranților sau musulmanilor. În februarie 2018, Consiliul Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării (CNCD) a hotărât că afirmatiile unui profesor de la Universitatea din București împotriva persoanelor care poartă vălul islamic în instituții de învățământ, precum universitățile, reprezintă discriminare, limitează dreptul la educație și încalcă dreptul la demnitate. CNCD a aplicat o amendă contraventională în valoare de 2000 RON (aproximativ 430 EUR).

Cel mai important eveniment care a afectat musulmanii în perioada de raportare, a fost respingerea de către Camera Deputaților a propunerii legislative de a interzice acoperirea feței cu orice material care împiedică recunoașterea fizonomică în instituțiile de învățământ. La momentul redactării acestui raport, propunerea a fost înaintată la Senat pentru dezbateri.
Country Profile

Country: Romania
Type of Regime: Democratic Republic
Form of Government: Semi-Presidential System
Ruling Parties: Partidul Social Democrat - PSD (Social-Democrat); Alianta Liberărilor si Democratilor – ALDE (Liberal)
Opposition Parties: Partidul National Liberal – PNL (Liberal); Uniunea Salvatii România – USR (Centre-Right); Partidul Miscarea Populara – PMP (Centre-Right)
Last Elections: 2014 Presidential Election (Klaus Iohannis of PNL – National Liberal Party won with 54.4% of votes against Victor Ponta of PSD – Social Democrat Party 45.6%); 2016 Legislative Election (PSD: 221 [Centre-Left], PNL: 99 [Centre-Right], USR: 43 [Centre-Right], UDMR: 30 [Centre-Right], ALDE: 29 [Centre-Right], PMP: 20 [Centre-Right], Minorities: 17)
Total Population: 20,121,641 (2011 census)
Major Languages: Romanian (official) 85.4%, Hungarian 6.3%, Romani 1.2%, Other 1%, Unspecified 6.1% (2011 est.)
Official Religion: No official religion (secularism)
Statistics on Islamophobia: No statistics available
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: There are no designated procedures for recording hate crimes by the Romanian police. Consequently, criminal offenses committed with a bias motivation cannot be identified through the system. According to the National Council for Combatting Discrimination (NCCD), in 2017, there were 652 petitions registered, out of which the largest number of petitions received were on the grounds of belonging to a social category (114) and the smallest numbers were on the grounds of race (2). There were 18 petitions submitted on the grounds of religion. The NCCD found discrimination in 117 cases.
Major Religions (% of Population): Eastern Orthodox (86.45%), Roman Catholic (4.6%), Reformed Protestants (3.19%)
Muslim Population (% of Population): 0.34%
Main Muslim Community Organisations: Romanian Muftiyat, Diyanet Foundation
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: Centrul Cultural Islamic “Islamul azi” (The Islamic Cultural Centre “Islam Today”), Liga Islamica si Culturala din Romania (The Islamic and Cultural League in Romania), The Coalition for the Rights of Migrants and Refugees (CDMiR), ActiveWatch.
Far-Right Parties: The New Right Party – PND (Partidul Noua Dreapta), United Romania Party - PRU (Partidul Romania Unita), Greater Romania Party – PRM (Partidul Romania Mare)
Far-Right Movements: N/A
Far-Right Terrorist Organisations: N/A
Limitations to Islamic Practices

Hijab Ban: In December 2017, a legislative proposal for banning face coverage with any material that prevents the recognition of physiognomy in educational institutions was launched by 26 MPs. The proposal was overwhelmingly rejected by the Chamber of Deputies in April 2018 and further submitted to the Senate for deliberation.

- Halal Slaughter Ban: No
- Minaret Ban: No
- Circumcision Ban: No
- Burka Ban: No
- Prayer Ban: No
Introduction

Romania features mostly as a country of emigration, registering a population decrease of 6% since 2007, the third highest decrease in the European Union. As such, the presence and integration of immigrants in Romanian society remains marginal in the political and public debates.

According to the 2011 Census there were 64,337 registered Muslims in Romania that make up for under 1% of the total population. Most Muslims in Romania live in urban settlements (49,795) with the Turks and Tartars being the largest Islamic communities. A total of 20,561 Turks and 14,376 Tartars live in urban areas, whereas 6,342 Turks and 5,684 Tartars are registered in the villages of southern Romania. Most Muslims are located in the county of Constanta (43,279) and Bucharest (9,037).

Islam is one of the 18 registered religious denominations specified in Romanian law. At the last census Muslims accounted for 0.34% of the population. Despite the small number of immigrants living in Romania hostility towards Muslims and anti-immigrant rhetoric were present in the public sphere during the year. The findings of a recent Pew Research study revealed that among Europeans, Romanians were among the least accepting of Muslims, with only 29% of surveyed Romanians being open to the idea of welcoming Muslims into their families or neighbourhoods.

Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents and Discursive Events

Physical and Verbal Attacks

Based on the sources consulted, no information on racially motivated violence and incidents directed at Muslims could be found during the reporting period. There is no systemic data collection regarding hate crime and hate speech by the Romanian authorities. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EU-FRA) also


noted that Romania’s law enforcement agencies have not recorded the bias motivations of hate crimes. The same source further pointed out that there is a lack of understanding among police officers regarding what a hate crime is and how to investigate the bias motive of a crime. Representatives of NGOs mentioned that public authorities in Romania do not collect disaggregated data on hate crimes and other type of violence directed at Muslims. As such, hate crimes remained underreported.

The OSCE ODHIR’s reporting on hate crime in Romania also illustrates the shortage of data. No information is available for 2018 while the only incident recorded against Muslims was the March 2016 assault on two young Muslim women in Bucharest for wearing the hijab.

Romania’s initial endorsement of the UN Global Compact for Migration in November 2018 sparked small protests in Bucharest. These protests were organised by small and obscure nationalistic and neo-fascists movements rallied around Noua Dreapta (PND), a far-right movement that supports militant ultra-nationalism and strong Orthodox Christian religious convictions. The protests were organised under the title “Marş Împotriva colonizării României” (March against the colonisation of Romania) and were directed at immigrants in general; Muslims were mentioned as one of the ‘major threats’ to Romania that could result from the migration treaty.

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9. Ibid.
Employment
No significant developments with regard to the employment of Muslims were reported during the period under investigation. In the last data available (for 2017) the NCCD registered 273 petitions about access to employment. Fines were issued in 18 cases, and a warning in 14. The data, however, is not disaggregated by ethnic origin or religion.

The main risks faced by foreign workers in Romania are related to exploitation and differential treatment. There have been reports of behaviour related to individual employment contracts (not having a contract, having fewer working hours registered in the contract or lower payment recorded in the contract, not being paid for overtime work or delays in receiving their salary) or cases of exploitation (for instance, having to work for longer than 12 hours per day with no weekly rest days). Job scarcity, low wages, lack of language proficiency, and lack of recognised academic degrees and other certifications often result in unemployment or employment without a legal contract and its related benefits and protections.

A 2016 study on discrimination of immigrants in Romania which interviewed 30 third-country nationals pointed out that some racist or xenophobic attitudes, especially towards individuals with a different skin colour or those coming from the Middle East, can result in limiting the immigrants’ access to certain professions.10 Also, interviewed persons who had or have small businesses (especially Arabs) complained about being a preferred target for controls by the Financial Guard.11 Given the low number of immigrants interviewed and the lack of comprehensive data and studies on exploitation of migrant workers in Romania, we should be careful in drawing conclusions.

Education
The education system in Romania guarantees a high degree of support for minority languages. In 2011, Romania adopted an education law which provides tuition for a minimum number of pupils in minority languages at various levels.12 The only educational institution for the training of imams in Romania is the Kemal Ataturk National College in Medgidia, where a theological profile class operates.13 Turkey offers scholarships for graduates of the college but due to the shrinking number of Muslims in Romania very few apply.14

Discrimination in educational institutions is rarely observed due to the small number of Muslims. However, incidents were recorded when certain university lecturers inappropriately commented on Islam-related matters. In October 2017, a professor of Political Science at the University of Bucharest was accused of discrimination after asking a Muslim student not to wear the Islamic veil during class. In February 2018, the NCCD ruled that the professor’s statements constitute discrimination, limit the right to education, and infringe the right to dignity, and issued a fine for RON 2000 (about EUR 430). 15

Politics

Romania’s decision in November 2018 to adopt the UN Global Compact for Migration reignited the debate on migration which wasn’t present on the public and political agenda throughout the year. However, in the context of a variety of views among European Union Member States and as the 2018 President of the European Union Council, Romania considered it “important to maintain a balanced approach”. As such, the delegation abstained from the final vote. 16 Earlier in the month, small protests against signing the treaty were organised by nationalistic, racist, and xenophobic organisations in Bucharest and other cities. 17

In April 2017, the nationalistic parties United Romania Party (PRU), the Greater Romania Party (PRM), and Noua Dreaptă (PND) formed an alliance, the National Identity Bloc in Europe (BINE), with the objective of participating in the upcoming elections for the European Parliament as well as presidential, local, and legislative elections that will take place during 2019 and 2020. 18 All three parties made derogatory statements and encouraged negative attitudes towards immigrants and Muslims. In December 2018, Noua Dreaptă (PND) also sponsored street protests against the adoption of the UN Global Compact for Migration considering that the pact would transform Romania into “a colony saturated with Muslims and Africans”. 19 The protests were low in turnout and impact.

The centre-right People’s Movement Party (PMP) founded by former President of Romania Traian Basescu received 4.30% of votes in the last parliamentary elections and has been the main initiator of the legislative proposal to ban face covering in educational institutions.

The project of building a large mosque in Bucharest initiated in 2015 after an agreement between the Romanian and Turkish governments was cancelled in 2018. The Romanian Muftiyat, which represents Muslims in the country, said they could not afford the overall costs of this investment. However, Turkey’s ambassador to Bucharest told Romanian journalists that Ankara would not insist on concluding the project if it threatened bilateral relations with Bucharest.20 The project was criticised by a series of Romanian politicians in previous years and sparked some protests by small right-wing and anti-Islamic groups.

Media
The media discourses in Romania overemphasised the “Islamic threat” by perpetuating the idea of the imminent “Muslim invasion” and its “dangerous impact” on the European Union.

As immigration has been mainly a non-issue on the public agenda during the year, only a small number of nationalistic and Orthodox media outlets continued to report on immigration issues using stereotypes, bombastic headlines, and factual misrepresentations of Muslims for gaining online exposure. Several mainstream media outlets also published depictions of Muslims using stereotypes, often taking facts out of context, or deliberately publishing fake news to manipulate public opinion. Below are a number of headlines that illustrate this kind of approach.

Figure 2: “The Silent Jihad. Alarming Discoveries about the Muslim Immigrants, in an Undercover Investigation. Radical Islam and Hatred towards Europeans” (Jihadul tăcut. Dezvăluiri alarmante despre imigranții musulmani, într-o investigație sub acoperire. Islam radical și dispreț față de europeni)21.


This type of reporting hasn’t been widespread, as most popular publications used a balanced discourse in reporting issues regarding Muslims and immigrants, and no other major media campaigns targeting Muslims were registered during the reporting period.

Justice System

The most significant legal development affecting the rights of Muslims that took place during the year was the rejection of the draft bill proposing to prohibit covering the face in educational institutions without providing for a religious exemption.

If the law passes, the burka, niqab, or other clothing used to cover the face for cultural (religious or ethnic) or other reasons, except for medical purposes, will be banned in educational institutions. Initiated in December 2017 by a group of 26 MPs from the three parliamentary parties Popular Movement Party (PMP), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats Party (ALDE), and the National Liberal Party (PNL), the bill received a negative advisory opinion from the government and was overwhelmingly rejected by the Chamber of Deputies in April 2018. The bill was further submitted for assessment to the Senate.26

Critics of the proposal have pointed out that there are very few women in Romania who wear such coverings.27 Furthermore, the president of the national equal-


27. According to Islamic Studies expert Alina Isak Alak there are only a handful of women wearing the Islamic veil in Romanian educational institutions. Another expert, Fatma Yılmaz, has pointed out that according to data received from the Ministry of Internal Affairs no person wearing the Islamic veil has been registered while issuing ID documentation. See: Florinela Iosip, “Antiburka Law in Romanian Schools: Measure of Security or Manifestation of Hate towards Islam? (Lege antiburka în școlile din România: măsură pentru siguranță sau o manifestare a urii față de islam?), Adevarul, 22 December 2017, http://adevarul.ro/educatie/scoala/lege-antiburka-scolile-romania-masura-siguranta-manifestare-urii-fata-islam-l_5a3bd44d7a7438d957e58/index.html, (Access date: 5 September 2019). There were no other figures on women wearing the Islamic veil in Romania in the sources consulted.
ity body has stated that “the association of the Islamic veil with terrorism is a proof of hate speech against a minority culture in Romania”.28

Internet

Romania has its own radical groups that have been fuelled mostly by the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and that still actively promote anti-Muslim sentiment - although with less frequency - in the context of migration in the European Union and the recent adoption of the UN pact on migration. Most anti-immigration, anti-Islamist activists have ties with nationalistic movements such as the New Right party (*Noua Dreaptă*).

An EU assessment of the removal of online hate speech by IT companies in the online environment published in January 2018 found that across the EU hate speech has been directed most commonly towards ethnic origin (17.1%), anti-Muslim hatred (16.4%), and xenophobia (16%). In Romania, 63 such cases of illegal online hate speech have been reported, with a rate of removal from the online platforms of 76.2%.29

The Facebook page “We don’t want a mega-mosque in Bucharest”, 30 created to oppose the building of a grand mosque in Bucharest, although not as active as in the past years, has saluted the cancellation of the construction, considering it a victory and a consequence of the protests they organised against the project. The page still posts or shares anti-Muslim content frequently that receives moderate engagement, such as the racist photo shared on 30 November, 2018 that states, “Over 60% of refugees are Muslims. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait are all 99% Islamic countries and ZERO refugee intake. This PROVES they’re INVADERS – not REFUGEES” (Fig. 7).

Figure 7. “Over 60% of refugees are Muslims. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait are all 99% Islamic countries and ZERO refugee intake. This PROVES they’re INVADERS – not REFUGEES”.31

28. Ibid.


30. The page can be consulted here: https://www.facebook.com/NuVremMegaMoscheeInBucuresti/, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network

The main actors that are promoting Islamophobia are small far-right movements and parties that combine a nationalistic agenda, strong Orthodox Christian religious convictions, and elements of the fascist ideology of the Legionary Movement (the Romanian fascist movement during World War II). They are active in trying to gain public exposure and political support by adopting a strong stance on immigration and xenophobic rhetoric.

Most of these movements are relatively obscure and group themselves around the more established *Noua Dreaptă* (PND), which was registered as a political party in 2015. The PND is known to have branches abroad, including the Republic of Moldova and according to some sources it also maintains political relations with similar anti-European and anti-NATO groups from different countries.32

During the year, the PND and other lesser known movements33 have been at the forefront of organising the protests against the adoption of the UN Global Compact for Migration. Their exposure and impact, however, has been minimal.

The parliamentary party People’s Movement Party (PMP) has been the main initiator of the 2017 legislative proposal to ban face covering in educational institutions. (See Justice System section). PMP senator Vasile Cristian Lungu has advocated for the rejection of the UN Global Compact for Migration stating that most refugees originating from Syria and Iraq are “young, illiterate or semi-illiterate men, without papers, and this fact must be emphasised, overwhelmingly, of Muslim religion” and that in European cities the “violent crimes - especially rape, crimes and robberies, and terrorist attacks are committed in overwhelming numbers by Muslims”.34

Observed Civil Society and Political Assessment and Initiatives

The National Council for Combating Discrimination has become increasingly effective in its work. It has received a growing number of petitions over the years

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33. The 13 signatories of the December 2018 “March against the colonisation of Romania” were *Asociația Noua Dreaptă, Frația Ortodoxă Sfântul Mare Mucenic Gheorghe, Asociația pentru Cultură, Educație și Valori Europene, Asociația Bucovina Prefundă, Asociația Calcai Neamului, Asociația Gogu Putu, Asociația Pro Consumatori, Asociația pentru Revigorarea Tradiției, Asociația Scut Botoșanean, Fundația Ion Gavrilă Ogoneanu, Fundația Sfintii Marii Brâncoveni și Asociația pentru Toleranță în Spațiu Public.

and has provided its expert opinion on judicial proceedings. The equality body’s activity has, however, been criticised by conservative politicians who view it as the “policeman of political correctness” and there are more and more calls in the public space targeting the NCCD. The vice-president of the National Liberal Party (PNL) Ben Oni Ardelean and other politicians asked for the institution to be closed down. He specified that “the NCCD is a Gestapo-type institution which does nothing else but trying to oppress any form of freedom of expression as well as belief and religious freedom”.

The NCCD partnered with 20 other organisations across seven European countries, including four national ministries, several regional public authorities, universities, and NGOs on an Erasmus project to combat radicalisation and promote inclusion.

The Coalition for the Rights of Migrants and Refugees (CDMiR), established in 2017 by a group of eleven Romanian NGOs active in the field of migration, human rights, and public policies, welcomed four more members in 2018, including the national branches of two prestigious international organisations, Save the Children and Terre des Hommes. The CDMiR now has 20 NGO members, and four supporters (three academic institutions and the Romanian UNHCR Office) and strives to improve the perception of migrants and refugees in the public space, and advocates for the improvement of their access to basic rights and services. The coalition’s priorities going forward focus on education, citizenship, and access to the labour market.

The main NGOs committed to protecting and advancing the interests of Muslims in Romania are Centrul Cultural Islamic “Islamul Azi” (The Islamic Cultural Centre “Islam Today”) and Liga Islamica si Culturala din Romania (The Islamic and Cultural League in Romania).

ActiveWatch is a human rights organisation that advocates for free communication for public interest. Among other activities, ActiveWatch strives to tackle racism and discrimination in the media and produces an annual report on hate speech in Romania.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The presence of Muslims in Romania remains a marginal issue on the political and public agenda. Although no major internal developments affecting Muslims have been registered during the reporting period, stereotypical portrayal of Muslims in the media and in populist speeches by politicians, have facilitated a growing trend of manifestations of intolerance and hate speech towards Muslims. The authorities’ lack of preparation, collaboration, and interest in tackling racism and discrimination, as well as the civil society’s insufficient resources to provide support are the main issues that need to be addressed.

- Authorities should adopt a strategy on preventing and combatting discrimination, and annual action plans for its implementation.
- Relevant authorities should develop and promote the harmonisation of data collection in areas of hate crime and racism, recognising anti-Muslim bias as a category.
- Including hate crime and speech as well as anti-discrimination legislation in the compulsory initial and continuous training of all law enforcement and legal professionals.
- Implementing a long-term monitoring mechanism to prevent ethnic and Islamophobic hatred in mass media and cyberspace.
- Initiating a collaboration between competent authorities in the field of immigration, labour and institutions combating discrimination and NGOs in order to elaborate integrated public policies.
- NGOs should strengthen their relationship with the Muslim community and enhance their legal capacity to assist victims of discrimination and hate crime.

Chronology

- **22.02.2018**: A fine for discrimination, limiting the right to education, and infringing on the right to dignity was issued by the NCCD for a professor of Political Science at the University of Bucharest who asked a Muslim student not to wear the Islamic veil during class.41
- **18.04.2018**: The draft bill proposing to prohibit covering the face in educational institutions without providing for a religious exemption was overwhelmingly rejected by the Chamber of Deputies. The bill was further submitted for assessment to the Senate.42

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41. ”Press Release on the Decisions Taken by the CNCD College of Directors in the Meeting of 22.02.2018”, (Comunicat de presă referitor la hotărârile adoptate de Colegiul director al CNCD în ședința din data de 22.02.2018), NCCD, (Access date: 3 September 2019)

42. At the time of writing this report, there weren’t any developments: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck2015.proiect?idp=16761.
• **05.12.2018:** A protest organised by nationalistic movements against the adoption of the UN Global Compact for Migration took place in Bucharest.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) “The Romanians Who Do Not Understand Anything about Migration, But Protest about the ‘Colonisation of the Country’”, (Românii care nu înțeleg nimic din migrație, dar protestează față de ‘colonizarea țării’), Vice.