By gathering 39 local scholars, experts, and civil society activists specialized in racism and human rights, the fourth edition of the European Islamophobia Report addresses a still timely and politically important issue. All 34 country reports included in this book follow a unique structure that is convenient, first, for comparing country reports and, second, for selected readings on a particular topic such as politics, employment, or education with regards to Islamophobia across Europe.

The present report investigates in detail the underlying dynamics that directly or indirectly support the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Europe. This extends from Islamophobic statements spread in national media to laws and policies that restrain the fundamental rights of European Muslim citizens. As a result, the European Islamophobia Report 2018 discusses the impact of anti-Muslim discourse on human rights, multiculturalism, and the state of law in Europe.

This fourth edition of our report highlights how European societies are challenged by the rise of violent far-right groups that do not only preach hatred of Muslims but also participate in the organization of bloody terror attacks. The rise of far-right terrorist groups such as AFO (Action of Operational Forces) in France or the network Hannibal in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland confirms EUROPOL’s alarming surveys on the growing danger of right-wing terrorism.

This year, SETA worked in cooperation with the Leopold Weiss Institute, an Austrian NGO based in Vienna dedicated to the research of Muslims in Europe. In addition, the European Union has funded the European Islamophobia Report 2018 through the program "Civil Society Dialogue Between EU and Turkey (CSD-V)".

About SETA
Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) is a non-profit research institute based in Turkey dedicated to innovative studies on national, regional and international issues. SETA is the leading think tank in Turkey and has offices in Ankara, Istanbul, Washington D.C. and Cairo. The objective of SETA is to produce up-to-date and accurate knowledge and analyses in the fields of politics, economy, and society, and inform policymakers and the public on changing political, economic, social, and cultural conditions. Through research reports, publications, brainstorming sessions, conferences and policy recommendations, SETA seeks to guide leaders in government, civil society, and business, and contributes to informed decision making mechanisms.
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**Disclaimer:** Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the *European Islamophobia Report* are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression of the editors or the funding institutions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Directorate for EU Affairs.

Executive Summary

In a year dominated by Brexit, Islamophobia received both unwanted and welcome attention in the UK during 2018. On the negative side, the upward trend in Islamophobic incidents in the UK continued in 2017-18 (the typical census period for official government data), with the number of cases recorded in official statistics rising by 17% and religion-specific cases by a staggering 40% (double the figure of 2015/16). Instances of vandalism directed at places of worship also recorded a significant (50%) rise in the same period. The government has belatedly recognised the dangers posed by the rapidly escalating far-right activity, supported by the operation of a decentralised - and therefore hard to regulate, for both states and social media platforms - global online network. Islamophobia is also increasingly turning into a ‘blind spot’ for mainstream society. The year 2018 witnessed the transformation of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) into an openly Islamophobic party and an alarming rise of Islamophobic entanglements involving figures of the governing Conservative party. Meanwhile the ‘othering’ of Muslims is promoted by political and media narratives in key fields as security (long-standing association with terrorism), education (‘takeover’ of schools), the criminal justice system (disproportionate representation of Muslims in prison population), employment (higher unemployment of Muslims; barriers to promotion; discriminatory practices at work), and gender (depiction of Muslim women as victims of a ‘non-western’ culture).

On the positive side, the publication of a landmark report by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims has produced a consensus definition of Islamophobia as a form of racism and has generated significant momentum towards the official adoption of such a definition, in spite of government resistance. Civil society organisations too have continued to play a critical role in terms of both challenging stereotypes or inaccurate representations of Muslims and promoting a positive view of the Muslim contribution in British society. Finally, there has been a growing number of initiatives that seek to inscribe Islamophobia - while distinct in its characteristics and in need of discrete legal recognition - into broader pathologies that are rooted in racism and affect Muslims as part of wider oppressed and minoritised segments of British society.
Country Profile

Country: United Kingdom
Type of Regime: Constitutional Monarchy
Form of Government: Parliamentary Democracy headed by a Prime Minister leading the Executive.
Ruling Parties: Conservative Party (since 2010)
Opposition Parties: Labour Party (official opposition of Her Majesty’s Most Loyal Opposition); Liberal Democrats; regional parties (Scottish National Party; Plaid Cymru; Democratic Unionist Party; Sinn Féin); Green Party; Change UK (since 2019).
Last Elections: 2017 Parliamentary Election: The Conservative party won 42.40% of the vote and 317 out of 650 parliamentary seats in the House of Commons, falling short of an outright majority; the Labour party came second with 40% and 262 seats, with the Liberal Democrats third (in votes) with 7.9% but only 12 seats and the Scottish National party fourth with 3% but with a larger share of 35 seats (all in Scotland). The Democratic Unionist party won 10 seats in Northern Ireland (0.2% of the vote) and provided support to the minority government formed by the Conservative party.
Major Languages: English (98%), Scots (2.5%), Welsh (1%); Scottish Gaelic, Cornish, and Irish (all <0.1%)
Official Religion: Church of England (Anglican) in England only; no established religion in other parts of the United Kingdom.
Statistics on Islamophobia: The upward trend in Islamophobic incidents in the UK continued in the figures for 2017-18, with the number of cases recorded in official statistics rising by 17% and religion-specific cases by a staggering 40% (double the figure of 2015/16). There were 2,965 recorded cases of Islamophobic hate crime, representing 52% of all recorded religiously motivated hate crime offences.
The percentage of Muslim adults (16 or over) who were victims of religiously motivated crime in 2017-18 was nearly double that recorded for any other religious group (0.8%). In the London metropolitan area, Islamophobic hate crimes recorded a 25% rise in 2017-18 when compared to the previous year, reaching a total figure of 1,668 incidents.
A recent report published by the National Union of Students (NUS) reveals that one in three students with Muslim background have suffered attacks on university campuses. The number of Muslim prisoners also continues to grow disproportionately, representing more than 15% of the total prison population (nearly double the percentage figure from ten years ago), with an even higher figure of 28% among inmates of high security facilities.
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: In 2018, 950 racist incidents were reported to the police, down 16% from 2017, which itself saw a fall from the 2,000 reported in 2016.

Major Religions (% of Population): Christianity (59.5%), No religion (25.7%), Islam (4.5%), Hinduism (1.3%), Sikhism (0.7%), Judaism (0.4%), Buddhism (0.4%), Other (0.4%) [2011 census]


Main Muslim Community Organizations: Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Muslim Association of Britain

Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: Muslim Council of Britain, Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND), Tell MAMA UK, Islamophobia Watch, Islamic Human Rights Commission, Islamophobia Response Unit (ISU), Cage, HOPE Not Hate

Far-Right Parties: British National Party (BNP), UK Independence Party (UKIP), National Front, English Democrats, British Democrats

Far-Right Movements: English Defence League (EDL), Britain First (deregistered in 2017), For Britain, Generation Identity, New British Union (NBU), Football Lads Alliance, Veterans Against Terrorism, Blood and Honour, British Movement

Far-Right Terrorist Organisations: Combat 18, National Action (proscribed in 2016)

Limitations to Islamic Practices

- Hijab Ban: No, but schools have the right to determine their own dress code, which has led to some cases of hijab ban for particular student age groups.
- Halal Slaughter Ban: No
- Minaret Ban: No
- Circumcision Ban: No
- Burka Ban: No
- Prayer Ban: No
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Introduction
The recent relentless intensity of the Brexit topic in the UK’s public domain left very narrow margins for other topics to creep up the list of ‘newsworthy’ items. Still, 2018 was also the year in which the UK authorities finally began to acknowledge the grave - and steadily growing - threat to community cohesion from the far right.¹ A report published by the HOPE Not Hate (HnH) campaign showed how a new, younger generation of far-right activists are driving an organisational change that leans heavily on online media and a different ideological profile that is far less dependent on neo-Nazi symbolism and steeped in anti-Muslim hatred.² Recent data from the government’s counter-terrorism PREVENT programme revealed that the number of cases referred over concerns about far-right activity rose by a third; the proportion of those who were identified as being ‘at risk’ of radicalisation in the same group matches that of cases associated with what the programme identifies as ‘Islamist’ extremism.³

However, the increasingly significant role of Islamophobia in driving uncivility, hatred, and violence in the UK is not confined to the extremes of the political spectrum. In 2018, under its new leader Gerard Batten, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) underwent a transformation into a full-blown Islamophobic party. The uncertain future of the Brexit negotiations and above all the appointment of the high-profile far-right activist (and former leader of the English Defence League, EDL) Tommy Robinson as party advisor may provide UKIP with an unpredictable mobilising dynamic in the near future. Closer to the political mainstream, the governing Conservative party came under sustained criticism for its failure to tackle ‘institutional’ Islamophobia among its ranks, prompting calls for an independent inquiry into the extent of the problem.

A year after the publication of the Runnymede Trust’s twentieth anniversary report on Islamophobia, the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims concluded its six-month investigation into “a working definition of Islamophobia”. The final report recommended the adoption of a legal definition of Islamophobia as “rooted in racism and [constituting] a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness”.⁴ The report’s direct linking of Islamophobia

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with anti-Muslim racism is welcome, echoing long-held views to that effect by the Runnymede Trust, Muslim bodies, NGOs, academics, as well as the European Islamophobia report itself. So far the British government has resisted these calls. Still, that this debate is gathering new momentum in a year so crushingly dominated by Brexit can only be a positive development.

**Discussion of Islamophobia Incidents and Discursive Events**

**Physical and Verbal Attacks**

In 2017-18, hate crime in the UK continued a long-term upward trend, according to the official government statistics released annually by the Home Office for England and Wales in October, rising by 17% year-on-year to just above 94,000 offences. Figures for racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded by the police reveal that, after the peak observed in the summer of 2017, there was another swing upwards during the first three months of 2018. 'Racially or religiously aggravated offences' constituted the overwhelming majority of recorded incidents, with race (71%) and religion (8%) showing a significant degree of overlap (for example, adults with an Asian and Muslim background are far more likely to be victims of hate crime). The released data show that, where such information was recorded, the flag 'Muslim' applied to 52% of the 5,680 total religiously aggravated recorded offences. Overall, the number of hate crime offences explicitly linked to religion rose by 40% year-on-year and has nearly doubled since 2015-16. Figures for Scotland are released separately and show a somewhat more positive picture, with both 'religion' and 'race' flags recording a drop of 4% and 5% respectively in comparison to 2016/17.


The detailed annual Tell MAMA report on anti-Muslim hate crime, released in June, showed that there was an overall significant rise (26%) in verified reported incidents (a total of 1,201), with significant spikes (up to 700%)! triggered by the Manchester and London Bridge terrorist incidents in May-June 2017. Alarmingly, the majority of incidents captured by Tell MAMA (70%) occurred offline - and overwhelmingly in public places (c. 64%), recording a rise of 30% for incidents occurring on the street;\(^1^1\) they involved mostly abusive behaviour (52%) but also physical attacks (18%) and vandalism (10%); they were typically perpetrated by white males

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and targeted mostly women (60%) - largely due to their higher religious visibility - with an Asian background (40%); and they were disproportionately concentrated in the north-west of the country and in the Greater London area, with Yorkshire and West Midlands coming third and fourth respectively in the list of recorded anti-Muslim incidents recorded by region. When it came to online incidents, the Tell MAMA report showed the predominance of Twitter as the platform of choice for hate campaigns, with more than half of recorded and verified incidents, with Facebook a strong second (37%).

Incidents of offline physical and verbal attacks also followed an upward trend from 437 in 2015 to 839 in 2017. The year drew to a close with a particularly horrific attack on a Syrian refugee pupil in Huddersfield that epitomised the rising racial and religious violence trend against immigrants and Muslims recorded in official data. In October, a video surfaced online showing a ‘waterboarding’-style torture ritual carried out by a 16-year-old boy against Jamal, a schoolboy of 15 years of age whose family had arrived in the UK fleeing persecution from the Syrian regime back in 2010. As it transpired, Jamal had suffered chronic abuse since arriving in the UK.

including an incident of inflicted injury to his hand only weeks before the attack recorded on the video.\textsuperscript{14}

Instances of vandalism recorded an annual rise of 50\% in 2017 (rising to 81), mostly driven by a retribution mindset in response to triggers such as the terrorist attacks in Manchester and London.\textsuperscript{15} Provisional figures for the first half of 2018 have recorded a moderate drop from the peaks of 2017 (25 cases) but the trend in the second half of the year showed a renewed spike. Religious and educational institutions received the majority of these attacks. The typology of the recorded attacks against mosques ranged from symbolic acts of defacement (such as spraying graffiti: Heaton Mosque in Newcastle, in October;\textsuperscript{16} Anware Madina Mosque in Sunderland and Bait-ul-Lateef Mosque in Liverpool, in November; leaving bacon rashes on the door handle of Dunfermline Central Mosque in Scotland) to more co-ordinated violent attacks (using catapults to cause physical damage on the exterior of Masjid Qamarul Islam and Al-Hijrah Mosques in Birmingham in August) to arson attacks (Jamia Masjid Abu Huraira Mosque in Leeds in June; Al-Falah Islamic Centre in Manchester in December\textsuperscript{17}). But the most serious incident of physical attack in a Muslim place of worship was recorded in Cricklewood, London, when three young men deliberately drove a stolen vehicle into pedestrians heading into the Al-Majlis Al-Hussain Islamic Centre on 19 September, injuring three worshippers. The hit-and-run attack was preceded by serial verbal taunts directed at Muslim passers-by.\textsuperscript{18} Offensive graffiti also appeared in many public locations: indicatively, in May, vile anti-Muslim slogans were sprayed on a wall in Small Heath Park, Birmingham; in June, a co-ordinated campaign in Horncastle, Lincolnshire saw numerous buildings defaced with racist and anti-Muslim slogans; and in July a series of Islamophobic graffiti were scrawled on the walls of High Level Bridge in Newcastle, with councillor Dipu Ahad linking them to a serious escalation of anti-Muslim hate in the city.\textsuperscript{19}

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\textsuperscript{15} Tell MAMA, Annual Report 2017, p. 44-6.


But even the mere threat of an attack can have equally devastating effects on the lives of ordinary people and the social cohesion of their communities. In early March, an anonymous letter nominating 3 April as “Punish a Muslim Day” began arriving on the doorsteps of prominent members of Muslim communities, places of worship, and politicians with a Muslim background. The letter also contained direct threats against the safety of anyone belonging to the community and featured a grotesque points system for different kinds of violent attacks against physical and human targets. The campaign, which was also disseminated on social media (#PunishAMuslimDay hashtag on Twitter) gathered momentum during the rest of March and early April, with the letters often containing (non-toxic but in some cases irritant, as it turned out) white powder. The impact of the campaign on Muslim communities

across the UK was significant, especially since the authorities could not ascertain the credibility and source of the threat ahead of 3 April. It was only on 12 June that David Parnham, a 35-year-old British white supremacist with a long history of sending out hundreds of abusive, racist, and Islamophobic letters, was arrested and charged with soliciting murder and orchestrating a campaign of intimidation with intent to cause distress to Muslim communities.23

Employment
In December, the daily broadsheet The Guardian published an extensive survey on racial bias in the UK. The survey collated evidence of such bias in all spheres and activities of public life with regard to British black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic groups (BAME) and then compared the figures to relevant experiences collected from white British. When it came to the workplace, the survey revealed that 57% of BAME respondents had found it harder to work because of their minority status, with four in ten claiming that they earned less than, or worked harder for the same money with, their white counterparts. Furthermore, 43% reported discriminatory practices when it came to job promotion. In all areas, respondents with a Muslim background intimated a more negative experience from other religious minority group.24 A similar picture is given by the 2017 report by the Trade Union Congress (TUC), which found that 37% of BAME workers have experienced dis-

discrimination or harassment in the workplace, with a significant portion suffering psychologically and physically as a result.\textsuperscript{26}

With the UK government having stated back in 2016 that it has no intention to introduce any public restrictions to Islamic practices including the workplace (in spite of evidence of public opinion support for a ban on the ‘burqa’ in public places\textsuperscript{27}), the bulk of reported cases of discrimination in employment during 2018 have centred on conscious or unconscious bias in access to employment, conditions of work (including treatment by management and other employees), pay and promotion opportunities for employees with a Muslim background. Google UK was reportedly forced to settle a racial discrimination case for failing to protect a British contractor of Moroccan descent from harassment while working on a company project.\textsuperscript{28} Google, as well as other big companies such as Starbucks and Amazon\textsuperscript{29}, have recently been implicated in collective complaints on a global scale about discriminatory workplace practices that affect minority groups.

In particular, the impact of the so-called ‘Muslim penalty’ in employment has been extensively documented in a series of reports published in the last two years. It is well known, for example, that the unemployment rate among members of the Muslim community is the UK is almost twice that of the national average index, with people with Pakistani and Bangladeshi background topping the list with a 10% unemployment rate.\textsuperscript{30} Furthermore, British Muslims are the most under-represented religious group in top professional posts.\textsuperscript{31} Once again, however, the ‘Muslim penalty’ has a predominant intersectional dimension, with not only religion and ethnicity but also race, class, and of course gender multiplying the gap. A combination of factors such as the cumulative impact of austerity on the Muslim population


(over-represented in the 10% of the most deprived local authorities) and on women with BAME background\textsuperscript{32} have combined with well-entrenched religious, racial, cultural, and gender stereotypes to affect access to, and generate discrimination in, employment for people with a Muslim background.\textsuperscript{33}

\section*{Education}

Especially since early 2014, when a letter allegedly outlining an extremist plot to ‘Islamise’ a network of schools in Birmingham was leaked to the press and gave rise to the government Operation ‘Trojan Horse’, education has been a key item in the public debate about radicalisation and Islamophobia. In 2018, as the dust on the scandal started to settle, it was time for reckoning and recriminations. In the end, although the investigation did uncover evidence that some schools ended up being run as faith institutions, there was no proof of an \textit{organised} ‘conspiracy’, as right-wing press and the government had alleged. Of the expected 100 or more cases of professional misconduct, only 15 ended up with charges - and all but one eventually collapsed in bitter recriminations.\textsuperscript{34} The handling of the investigation by the Department for Education and the education regulator Ofsted was widely criticised for giving in to a sensationalist approach to the matter that did lasting damage to community relations and added fuel to an Islamophobic climate in British society.\textsuperscript{35}

While the UK does not legally restrict any religious practice, the wearing of the religious dress in elementary schools proved a polarising item of public discussion in 2018.\textsuperscript{36} The decision of an East London school to ban the hijab for pupils under the age of eight - which was subsequently rescinded\textsuperscript{37} following not only pressure from parents and Muslim organisations but also a grotesque social media campaign against the school’s head teacher Neena Lall -,\textsuperscript{38} touched raw nerves within British society and brought to the surface much broader tensions about the balance between

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\end{thebibliography}
diversity and ‘British values’ in education. The right-wing press covered the issue mostly from the viewpoint of the headmaster’s right to uphold ‘fundamental British values’ in schools and her right to be protected from intimidation.39 The old adage that wearing the hijab ‘sexualises’ young women was re-circulated.40 Many, on the other hand, alleged that an attempt to restrict religious practice was using liberal pre-texts to mask an underlying racism.41 But the isolated school case was transformed into a symbolic battleground, with the head of Ofsted, Amanda Spielman, going as far as suggesting that “religious extremists” were active “perverting” education in UK schools.42 Spielman’s speech was nothing short of an unforgivable cliché parade, with the same vague calls in support of ‘fundamental British values’,43 ‘muscular liberalism’ juxtaposed to ‘passive liberalism’, and a shallow invocation of ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’.44

PREVENT continued to cast a shadow in the field of education with a 24% rise in referrals (totalling 2,462) in 2017/18 to the government’s flagship anti-extremism programme.45 The need for critical thinking to counter destructive extremist narratives from both the far right and religious fundamentalists must extend to building resilience inside educational institutions as well as in the crucial field of reporting and news coverage. In a recent report published by the National Union of Students (NUS), the revelation that one in three students with Muslim background have suffered attacks on university campuses46 should invite reflection on the corrosive effect of an uncritical approach to surveillance and the practical operation of PREVENT.

Politics

In August, the former foreign secretary Boris Johnson used his regular column in the broadsheet *The Telegraph* to comment on the recent Danish ban on the female Islamic dress. While he advocated that the UK maintain its current neutral legal attitude to religious dress in public, Johnson’s article caused a public uproar because he called the dress “ridiculous” for making women “look like letter boxes ... and bank robbers”.\(^{(48)}\) In spite of wide condemnation and calls to offer a public apology even by the prime minister Theresa May,\(^{(49)}\) Johnson refused to rescind his comments. Critics from across the political spectrum saw the comments as divisive, sexist, explicitly Islamophobic, and irresponsibly “pandering to the far right”.\(^{(50)}\) The matter was referred to the Equality and Human Rights Commission by the Labour MP Jess Phillips for constituting a violation of “at least two protected characteristics outlined in the Equality Act 2010” (religion or belief; and sex).

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In December, an internal Conservative party panel investigating Johnson’s comments as a potential infringement of the party’s code of practice cleared him of any wrongdoing and argued that his comments were essentially “respectful”!51 But the incident, involving one of the most high-profile - and extremely popular with the party membership - Conservative figures, added further validity to claims that there is a much deeper problem of institutional Islamophobia in the Conservative party. The most consistent and vocal internal critic has been the Conservative peer Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, who has been arguing for long that Islamophobia is “very widespread” at all levels of her party.52 Warsi had actually called for an inquiry into Islamophobia in her party a month before the publication of Johnson’s column.53 The catalogue of infractions among the ranks of the Conservative party is long and consistently populated with fresh evidence of the extent of the problem: the Home Secretary was widely criticised for the language (“sick Asian paedophiles”) that he used on Twitter in response to news that twenty people were convicted for the ‘grooming crisis’ in

Rotherham;" councilor Jeff Potts’ calls to “deport and repatriate all Muslims from the UK” resulted in his temporary suspension from the party that however came to the end in autumn 2018, when Potts was readmitted without further sanction; another councilor, Karen Sunderland, claimed that Islam is a “totalitarian religion … and has become the new Nazism”; the MP Bob Blackman, who has been repeatedly involved in anti-Muslim incidents in the past, was forced to apologize for retweeting “in error” as he later claimed - an Islamophobic video posted by Tommy Robinson, the former leader of the EDL.

But it was UKIP that received the largest share of attention for its unabashed dalliance with Islamophobia in 2018. Following a disastrous showing in the 2017 parliamentary and 2017/2018 local elections and a series of internal crises that resulted in five leadership changes, the party went through a phase of fundamental restructuring that saw it focus on a broader cultural agenda increasingly gravitating towards an extreme anti-Muslim message. At the same time, under the leadership of Gerard Batten, UKIP is fast dismantling the firewall between it and the British far right that its long-time leader until 2016, Nigel Farage, had put in place in order to establish UKIP as a mainstream political party. Batten’s flirtation with the far right was confirmed when he first threw his support behind Tommy Robinson, who was arrested and imprisoned between May and August 2018 for breach of peace. At a rally protesting Robinson’s detention in August, Batten said that prophet Mohammed was “a paedophile who kept sex slaves”. In early September, and following Robinson’s release on bail, Batten proposed a motion to the party’s executive that would rescind the earlier ban on admitting former members of the EDL or the far-right British National Party (BNP). Vote on the motion has been subsequently deferred until March 2019 at the earliest; but this has not stopped Batten from hiring

Robinson as party advisor on “grooming gangs”. The move has divided the party, with a number of high-profile members (including former leaders Farage and Paul Nuttall) and MEPs resigning in protest; and with the former party chairwoman Suzanne Evans warning that the party is being taken over by a far-right faction led by Robinson with Batten’s full support.

UKIP’s transmutation into a far-right Islamophobic party was given a significant boost following the approval of a new ‘interim manifesto’ at the party’s conference in September. The manifesto has signalled a lurch towards the far right, with calls for scrapping large segments of current equality and human rights legislation, “all-Muslim prisons”, banning sharia law courts and the funding of mosque construction by other countries, enhanced screening for immigrants from Islamic countries, and a national enquiry into “Muslim grooming gangs”. These measures are contained in a chapter titled “combating Islamic literalist and fundamentalist extremism”, which openly associates key interpretations of Islam with terrorism.

The rise of Tommy Robinson in the public domain following his arrest and the #FreeTommy campaign have been pivotal in the revival of far-right mobilisation in the UK. In June, a rally held in London calling for Robinson’s release attracted a 15,000-strong crowd and was addressed by the leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) Geert Wilders. The event and the subsequent campaign became the rallying point for a convergence of a number of UK-based (Generation Identity, For Britain, Football Lads Alliance, White Pendragons) and European (the Polish Wolność party and the Flemish Interest) far-right organisations.
Media

In February, the parliamentary Home Affairs Committee on hate crime extended its enquiry into the role of printed media in fostering a culture of demonisation of minority groups and institutional discrimination against them. In April, the enquiry invited newspaper editors to the committee’s hearing. The sessions produced some remarkable statements. Quizzed about his newspaper’s long record of inflammatory front pages and op-eds, especially under the reign of its former editor Paul Dacre, the former deputy editor of the most widely read British tabloid newspaper Daily Mail, Peter Wright, largely exonerated printed media from any role in inciting racial or religious hatred. Wright blamed instead the “dreadful cesspit [of] social media” for the rise in Islamophobia in the public domain. Ian Brunskill, The Times associate editor, similarly rejected allegations of a deliberate campaign of misinformation in the British press to feed an Islamophobic moral panic. Andy Silverstein of The Sun tabloid newspaper rejected the prevalent association of the publication with anti-Muslim stories as “unfair”. The newspaper’s managing editor, Paul Clarkson, went even further, claiming that there was absolutely no issue with Islamophobia in the entirety of the British mainstream press.

Such statements have been received with a healthy, much-needed dose of derision by those who have documented the corrosive role of printed media in fostering a culture of mainstream Islamophobia.\(^{74}\) But it was Gary Jones, the recently appointed editor of *The Daily Express* and *The Sunday Express*, two tabloid papers with a long history of using inflammatory stories and language at the expense of Muslims and Islam,\(^{75}\) who provided the surprising admission that some of his newspaper’s front pages in the past were “downright offensive” and have “helped create an Islamophobic sentiment”.\(^{76}\) The problem is by no means confined to tabloid titles; it reaches deep into ‘broadsheet’ titles such as *The Telegraph* and *The Times*, as well as quality magazines like *The Spectator*. And it was deeply ironic that barely a day after its associated editor denied the existence of a problem with Islamophobia in front of the Home Affairs Committee that *The Times* was asked by the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) to correct a “distorted” front-page story regarding a “Muslim foster home” in Tower Hamlets, London dating back in August 2017.\(^{77}\)

Of course the problem with Islamophobia in the British media is not just one of misinformation and distortion; it also has to do with the uncritical reproduction of stereotypes and biases about the Muslim communities. In 2017, British actor Riz Ahmed gave a speech to the House of Commons on how Muslims are inaccurately portrayed on film and TV, suggesting a five-question test to identify stereotypes (Muslims portrayed as victims or perpetrators? Male characters shown as angry and misogynistic or female characters as oppressed? Shown as culturally backward? Presented as a threat to ‘western values’?\(^{78}\)). In September, the very popular terrorism-themed BBC series *The Bodyguard* was also accused of reproducing a stream of negative stereotypes about Muslim women.\(^{79}\)

**Justice System**

The UK criminal justice system (CJS) has continued to receive scrutiny and criticism with regard to its allegedly discriminatory practices. There is now a substantial body

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of evidence from different sources that underpins the narrative of racial and religious discrimination in the field of criminal justice. A recent in-depth study of data from 2006 to 2011 found that Muslims are far more likely, once stopped, to be searched, arrested, and prosecuted.\textsuperscript{80} Research carried out by the Ministry of Justice, especially in the light of the recommendations of the 2017 Lammy Review, corroborated the trend that young BAME individuals (representing 41\% of the young adults in the Criminal Justice System\textsuperscript{81}) faced the highest levels of disproportionality in all levels of the operation of the CJS.\textsuperscript{82} David Lammy has followed up his review with an unwavering advocacy of urgent government remedial action, including a call for the collection of detailed ethnicity data. But Lammy has also described the problem as a “social time bomb”, in the sense that it adversely affects BAME individuals after and well beyond their entanglement with the CJS, limiting their future access to key fields such as employment and housing.\textsuperscript{83}

While 2018 figures for stop-and-search incidents have continued their downward trend (currently 5 per 1,000 people, down from an equivalent figure of 23 in 2009-10), the over-representation of BAME groups in the statistics is still striking, with black and Asian individuals well above the average figure (29 and 8 per 1,000 respectively) and with huge regional disparities in police practices.\textsuperscript{84} The number of Muslim prisoners also continues to grow disproportionately, representing more than 15\% of the total prison population (nearly double the figure from ten years ago), with an even higher figure of 28\% among inmates of high security facilities.\textsuperscript{85} The prevalent framing of the government’s PREVENT counter-extremism programme through a conveyor belt approach that leads from the ‘war on terror’ and ‘radicalisation’ of Muslims to terrorism has embedded a strong Islamophobic bias in its operations from systematic surveillance to referral.\textsuperscript{86} A similar bias against Muslim communities has also extended from the public sphere into the private domain, with recent research pointing to underlying


\textsuperscript{86.} Fahid Qurashi, “The Prevent Strategy and the UK ‘War on Terror’: Embedding Infrastructures of Surveillance in Muslim Communities”, \textit{Palgrave Communications}, 4/17 (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-017-0061-9 (Access Date: 3 September 2019).
assumptions that the Muslim home can be treated as a pre-violent space. In the wake of the publication of the APPG’s report *Defining Islamophobia*, Muslim communities have now officially asked the government for full legal protection against Islamophobia. The government has so far refused to respond affirmatively.

**Internet**

The UK online Islamophobic network is thriving as only a part of an increasingly complex and sophisticated global, largely de-territorialised network of message amplification. Recent studies by HOPE not Hate, the Data&Society Research Institute, and POLITICO have painted a bleak picture of a powerful, extraordinarily effective, yet opaque in its workings and largely anonymous global operation, with partisan stories appearing online on even obscure far-right UK sites often amassing thousands or more ‘likes’ and shares within hours from launch. The network is based on a philosophy of deliberate secretive decentralisation, making it immensely hard to decipher its structure or operation, in contrast to more established outlets such as Breitbart. Fake stories with Islamophobic content and intent are easily and swiftly amplified through the shadowy network of news outlets, social media accounts, and numerous bots. Last November, Tommy Robinson admitted that he spread a fake story about the Muslim students including the Syrian refugee boy Jamal who had been filmed being bullied at his school in Huddersfield. Although there was a personal retraction from Robison himself only hours after the publication of his Facebook post, the fake story still managed to gain considerable traction among far-right news/campaign sites and social media accounts. Similarly, the fake story that during his imprisonment Robinson was deliberately moved to another prison with 71% Muslim inmates was picked up by UKIP MEP Janice Atkinson and by former Breitbart editor and unsuccessful candidate for the leadership of UKIP Raheem Kassam, having been extensively amplified by the US far-right conspiracy-theory website InfoWars and numerous social media accounts through it.

POLITICO shed light on how obscure new far-right/Islamophobic sites are instantly plugged into an already well-oiled global operation of strategic message amplification. The example analysed is the news website PoliticalUK.co.uk, which appeared only in April 2018 with a relatively small daily output of online stories and rather basic user-interface design but still managed to amass social media interactions in the thousands per story within only months from its launch. Last summer, Twitter admitted that it had effectively lost control of the misinformation campaign waged through it by announcing that it had suspended a staggering 70 million fake accounts only in the course of two months. Facebook and other popular social media platforms have appeared equally overwhelmed and unable to exercise meaningful control over an increasingly complex, active, and unpredictable matrix of hate propaganda. A recent study showed a significant degree of cross-overs between racist, nativist, and anti-Muslim online groups, with Islamophobia functioning as the ideological common denominator for the majority of entanglements.

In 2018, the Digital, Culture, Media, and Sports Committee of the UK parliament turned its attention to the topic of “disinformation and ‘fake news’”. The role of the two dominant social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, came under intense scrutiny, although Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg refused to heed two calls to provide evidence in person at a special committee session. Facebook did tighten its scrutiny procedures with regard to accounts that violated its rules about incitement of hatred via the platform. As a result, the pages of the far-right group Britain First and those of its leaders, Paul Golding and Jayda Fransen, were removed for their repeated anti-Muslim posts in March. In November, PayPal took action against the payment account of Tommy Robinson, months after Twitter revoked his access following infringements of its new ‘hateful conduct’ policies. Similar action was taken against InfoWars and other websites of the global anti-Muslim network in September.


Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network

The British far-right agitator that goes by the nom de guerre Tommy Robinson emerged as the undoubted grandee of the UK’s Islamophobic network in 2018. Robinson has extended his divisive portfolio of agitation from his original, fierce anti-Islam campaigning (now enriched with a cynical exploitation of the ‘grooming gangs’ theme⁹⁹) with the pursuit of mass mainstream respectability through his passionate defence of Brexit and his involvement with UKIP. With a Facebook army of more than a million followers and a well-oiled, truly globalised network of publicity strategic amplification¹⁰⁰, Robinson largely succeeded throughout 2018 in imprinting himself on public life, amazingly not only through his agitatory presence but also via his temporary absence due to imprisonment. The #FreeTommy off- and online campaign has created a veritable far-right global martyr out of him, bringing together in his support an unlikely coalition of neo-Nazi and far-right networks with alt-right stars, avowed libertarians, and mainstream populist politicians.¹⁰¹

Tommy Robinson was one of the nominees in the UK category of the Islamic Human Rights Commission’s (IHRC) annual Islamophobia awards, given to “politicians and figures of note within the UK who had flagrantly displayed the most Islamophobia”.¹⁰² The award went instead to the Conservative party with “an honourable and special mention to Boris Johnson”. Johnson’s article on the ‘burqa’, his puerile refusal to offer a public apology for his comments, and his party’s reluctance to call him out for his expressed views rendered the award defensible. The mayor of London Sadiq Khan has been a particular target of attacks by members of the party. It seems that the lessons from the grotesque Islamophobic campaign run by the party’s candidate Zac Goldsmith in 2016 have not prevented the Conservative mayoral candidate for the 2020 elections, Shaun Bailey, from retweeting online anti-Muslim propaganda that described London’s first Muslim mayor Sadiq Khan as the “mad mullah Khan of Londonistan”.¹⁰³ In July, the Conservative MP Michael Fabricant tweeted a sexually-themed picture of London mayor Sadiq Khan as a pig in the


margins of president Trump’s visit to London;\textsuperscript{104} unlike Johnson, at least Fabricant apologised afterwards. As the MCB stated, the failure of the Conservative party to take meaningful action against the long list of Islamophobic infractions among its ranks is a dangerous mainstream “licence to bigotry”.\textsuperscript{105}

The recent debate around the APPG’s published report and its calls for the adoption of a legal definition of Islamophobia have provided a stepping stone for a number of mainstream figures and organisations with known links to the state to join in a chorus of criticism of the definition or even the very term ‘Islamophobia’. Policy Exchange, an influential London-based right-wing think tank whose agenda-setting role for the centre-right has been widely documented for more than a decade,\textsuperscript{107} produced a hastily put-together 24-page publication authored by Sir John Jenkins, criticising the APPG’s definition. Trevor Phillips, the former chairman of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, prefaced the publication with the accusation that equating Islamophobia with racism serves “the interests of sectarians and those hostile to integration ..., especially the Far Right and Islamists”.\textsuperscript{108} The

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure10.png}
\caption{Conservative MP Michael Fabricant and his offensive tweet.\textsuperscript{106}}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{106} Taken from Twitter, https://twitter.com/vinnymcav/status/1017672124679557120, 13 July 2018. Original tweet has been deleted by owner.


Quilliam Foundation followed a similar line of direct criticism of the APPG’s definition but openly extended it to the term itself, with its International President Norman Benotman calling it “political poison convincing British Muslim communities that their religion is feared ... while compelling non-Muslim British society to believe that their Muslim counterparts have a special type of right”. It therefore seems that the Islamophobia ‘sceptics’ within the broader British Muslim community have swiftly joined forces with like-minded mainstream sceptics from the press and from certain think tanks in a coordinated defence of the government’s refusal to accept the APPG’s proposed definition of ‘Islamophobia’.

**Observed Civil Society and Political Assessment and Initiatives**

Civil society has played a central role in countering the rise of anti-Muslim prejudice and agitation in the past years - and its continuing, indeed increasing involvement in this direction is crucial in every meaningful effort to reverse the alarming trends noted in this report. The year 2017 had ended with the publication of a report by the APPG on British Muslims recording a wide range of community projects and initiatives carried out by Muslim charities in order to assist all citizens in need where they live and nationally. In 2018, the PM and the UK’s main political parties supported the ‘Visit My Mosque’ annual day events in February, during which more than 200 mosques across the country opened their doors to welcome visitors from the community and engage in dialogue about the role of Islam in contemporary British society. The ‘Islamophobia Awareness Month’ in November, which has been running with great success since 2012, is not only putting forward a positive view of the Muslims communities; it also offers an opportunity to chart and reflect on the deeper causes of contemporary anti-Muslim attitudes and behaviours. In March, the National Union of Students (NUS) published a report generated by the data collected in the context of its extensive ‘Muslim Stu-


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dents’ Survey’. The survey was launched in order to foster a better understanding of the range of issues facing Muslim students in higher education and to contribute to the fight against the normalisation of Islamophobia. In November, Faith Matters announced the ‘Stand Against Hate’ campaign, a desperately needed initiative to combat all forms of hate crimes against racial, religious, sexual, and other groups, by launching a crowdfunding campaign to raise funds for a series of posters asking people to ‘be upstanders, not bystanders’. Meanwhile, the contribution of all religious communities to life and society in contemporary Britain was recognised and celebrated in a number of events held as part of the UK Parliament and Interfaith Week in November. In November, the Muslim Council of Scotland and the Scottish Council of Jewish Communities came together in joint condemnation of hate crimes in a landmark case of concerted joint action to counter both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in Scotland.

The fight against counter-factual and - consciously or unconsciously - biased depictions of Muslims in the UK media is crucial for countering institutionalised Islamophobia, fostering social cohesion, and improving the aspirations of members of the UK Muslim communities. The role of Miqad Versi, head of the MCB’s Centre for Media Monitoring, in forensically challenging and seeking to correct Islamophobic news stories in UK media has received the recognition that it deserves. Beyond, however, national organisations with a long and established record in efforts to counter the spread of anti-Muslim racism, a significant body of civil society organisations and local groups also made crucial contributions to their communities and society as a whole. Such groups offered important evidence and know-how to the research carried out by the APPG on British Muslims, in preparation for the publication of its significant report last November. Communities from across the country were also involved as consultation participants and shared with the group’s members experiences that would have been impossible to capture otherwise. Their role in the formulation of arguably one of the most important contributions to the struggle for a legal definition of Islamophobia in the UK cannot be exaggerated.


118. APPG, Islamophobia Defined.
In addition, activities organised by local and regional civil society groups made a significant contribution to the fight against Islamophobia. In little over a month after the horrific attack on Jamal in Huddersfield, a GoFundMe crowdsourcing campaign to fund his relocation had raised more than £158,000, with funders not only from Britain but from more than fifty other countries. Similarly, individuals, community groups, and local/national organisations came together to provide reassurance, advice, and protection, off- and online, in the run-up to the ‘Punish a Muslim Day’ hate campaign in March-April. In December, a local Muslim youth charity from Charing Cross, London, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Youth Association, delivered 7,000 meals to local homeless people, in addition to their normal weekly provision of 150 meals. The Leeds Muslim Youth Forum published a collection of posters as part of their forthcoming campaign ‘I am Muslim’, aimed to highlight the wide range of positive contributions made by members of the Muslim communities to British public life.

![Image](https://example.com/image.png)

**Figure 11: The ‘I am Muslim’ range of posters by the Leeds Muslim Youth Forum.**


122. Taken from Twitter, [https://twitter.com/LeedsMuslimYF](https://twitter.com/LeedsMuslimYF), (Access date: 2 September 2019).
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Neither the rise of the far right nor the multiple expressions of institutionalised Islamophobia were problems created in 2018; but the year confirmed the challenges lying ahead in the fight against prejudice, discrimination, intimidation, and hate crime directed at the Muslim communities in the UK. Against the backdrop of profound political and social polarisation due to the overbearing discussion about Brexit, 2018 brought both significant welcome advances and disquieting setbacks in the efforts to arrest and reverse the trend of growing in scope and intensity Islamophobia. Rising hate crime figures; a depressing register of verbal and physical attacks both off- and online; the shadow cast by co-ordinated hate campaigns such as this year’s ‘Punish a Muslim’ hoax; the intensifying activities of a decentred far-right national and global network; the deleterious effect of deep-seated anti-Muslim prejudice in segments of both tabloid and broadsheet press; the ongoing penetration of anti-Muslim rhetoric deep into mainstream politics, journalism, and everyday life; and the relentless ‘penalty’ against members of Muslim – and more broadly BAME – communities across all spheres of public life, illustrate the enormity of the challenge still lying ahead.

Nevertheless 2018 can also be celebrated as a year that generated momentum towards an accepted legal definition of Islamophobia. Last year’s wish has come that decisively closer to becoming a reality, in spite of continuing opposition from government and ‘Islamophobia sceptics’. The report launched by the APPG on British Muslims in November has underlined the consensus among communities, NGOs, and experts on Islamophobia on an understanding of the problem of Islamophobia as a primarily intersectional one, where tributaries of religious, racial, cultural, and gender prejudices coalesce into a powerful, pernicious, and pervasive mechanism of ‘othering’ Muslims. Civil society too maintained an admirable output of initiatives to counter hate, provide relief to those affected, and promote a deservedly positive image of what Muslims can do and are doing in British society. In December, Newham Council in London became the first public authority in the UK to officially adopt the APPG definition as part of its efforts to combat hate crime; others have followed since, adding to the awareness momentum that should be sustained.

- Proactively feed the momentum generated by the 2018 APPG report for a legal definition of Islamophobia as a distinct form of, but also subset of, racism by working closer with media, parliamentarians, and Muslim community organisations to maintain the ‘noise’ of the campaign.
- Review the state’s counter-terrorism strategy, with a view to revising assumptions, processes, and provisions surrounding its PREVENT strand in

particular. The transfer of responsibility for surveillance from the state to educational and health institutions, as well as citizens in the private sphere has diffused the institutionalisation of Islamophobia and undermined Muslims in every aspect of their everyday life.

• Deconstruct the framing of the discussion about Islamophobia as a ‘twin’ problem of supposed balance between censuring the far right and invoking the threat of ‘Islamist extremism’ in the same narrative. This logic needs to be robustly challenged as political, social, and state practice at every possible level.

• Encourage civil society organisations to enhance their constructive input in the process of generating a range of counter-narratives, especially those focusing on the plurality of positive contributions to, and engagement with, society as a whole.

• Provide training to a wide range of practitioners, from educators to journalists to police, with a specific focus on a better understanding of unconscious bias and the workings of institutional racism.

• Promote an understanding of Islamophobia in the UK as an expression of a wider dynamic that is fed by broader racial and cultural prejudices (e.g. immigration, BAME discrimination, colonial legacies) and is international in its dynamic of self-perpetuation. Closer co-operation of civil society organisations both nationally, internationally, and above all intersectionally is crucial for enhancing reach and effectiveness across the board.

• Strengthen the role and accountability of government regulators (especially the Independent Press Standards Organisation [IPSO]), watchdogs, and independent bodies, particularly in fields that remain central to the propagation and normalisation of Islamophobia (traditional media, education, Internet).

• More pressure needs to be put on social media organisations by state and parliament to take ownership of the problem of uncontrolled, shadowy dissemination of hate propaganda and to enhance their effective oversight of the online networks that propagate and amplify hate messages.

• Ensure that significantly more resources be made available for the gathering, processing, and presentation of evidence regarding incidents of discrimination and hate crime against Muslims and other vulnerable minimised groups, both off- and online.

• Promote more effective awareness of, and action against, the undercurrents of inequality that continue to affect disproportionately communities with a Muslim background across the UK in tandem with other institutionally and socially oppressed groups in British society.
Chronology

- **01.02.2018**: Darren Osborne, the perpetrator of the Finsbury Park mosque attack in 2017, was found guilty of murder and attempted murder.
- **07.03.2018**: The leaders of the far-right group Britain First, Paul Golding and Jayda Fransen, were found guilty of religiously aggravated harassment.
- **09.03.2018**: The first ‘Punish a Muslim’ set of letters were received, calling for a day of violence against UK Muslims on 3 April.
- **13.03.2018**: Graffiti with the slogans ‘Kill all Muslims’ and ‘Pedo [sic] Muslim scum’ appeared on a wall in Birmingham, in the midst of a tense period caused by the stream of ‘Punish a Muslim’ letters nationwide.
- **03.04.2018**: The designated ‘Punish a Muslim’ day of violence passed without any major incident across the UK – but only after causing significant consternation among communities with a Muslim background and was responsible for a spike in anti-Muslim hate incidents off- and online.
- **25.04.2018**: Gary Jones, the new editor of *The Daily Express* and *The Sunday Express*, gave evidence in front of the Home Affairs Committee in which he acknowledged that his newspaper has systematically helped create an Islamophobic sentiment in the UK.
- **28.04.2018**: Bacon rashers were left on the door handle of the Dumferline Central Mosque.
- **05.06.2018**: An arson attack was carried out against the Jamia Masjid Abu Huraira Mosque, causing damage to its entrance, as well as the Guru Nanak Nishkam Sewak Jatha Gurdwara nearby.
- **09.06.2018**: A large #FreeTommy rally with the participation of UK far-right groups and European populist movements took place in London, in support of the then jailed former English Defence League leader, Tommy Robinson. An online campaign asking for his immediate release also gathered significant momentum since his imprisonment in May.
- **12.06.2018**: Police arrest David Parnham in relation to the national ‘Punish a Muslim’ hate campaign launched in February 2018 nominating 3 April as the day for launching the attacks.
- **24.06.2018**: The far-right group Generation Identity launched a co-ordinated campaign that covered female statues in niqab in a number of UK and Irish cities, calling simultaneously for a ‘ban on burqa’.
- **15.08.2018**: Two mosques in Birmingham, Masjid Qamarul Islam and Al-Hijrah, had their windows smashed after a co-ordinated attack carried out with catapults.
• **29.08.2018**: BRPI, an alleged far-right group, spread graffiti on the wall of a LIDL store in Worcester, demanding that the chain stop selling halal and kosher meat products, even if LIDL has made clear that the meat that it sells does not comply with such standards.

• **09.09.2018**: A car struck a number of pedestrians outside the Al-Majlis Al-Hussaini Islamic Centre in Cricklewood, North-West London, leaving one person injured.

• **20.09.2018**: UKIP launched its ‘Interim Manifesto’ at the party’s conference, with a series of extreme anti-Muslim policies that confirmed its transformation into a far-right party under its leader, Gerard Batten.

• **28.09.2018**: It emerged on the day that he was confirmed as the Tory candidate for the London 2020 mayoral elections that Shaun Bailey had expressed himself as an opponent of multiculturalism and had retweeted offensive content targeting the incumbent, Sadiq Khan.

• **19.10.2018**: Home Secretary Sajid Javid uses the inflammatory “sick Asian paedophiles” in response to news that members of a ‘grooming group’ in Rotherham were convicted. The tweet was widely criticised but Javid defended it in response.

• **05.11.2018**: A video showing a cardboard model representing Grenfell Tower (an apartment tower block in London which burnt down on 14 July, 2017, causing 72 deaths and more than 70 injuries) with cut-outs of figures representing Muslim residents set on fire, with residents represented with clear racial references, was posted online from a group of people who were shown to laugh and emulate calls for help from the trapped residents.

• **10.11.2018**: Offensive Daesh-themed graffiti were sprayed on the walls of Bait-ul-Lateef Mosque in Liverpool.

• **12.11.2018**: DVDs containing defamatory material targeting Islam were sent to schools and Muslim community organisations in London and Yorkshire.

• **27.11.2018**: The All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims launched its report *Islamophobia Defined*, following a months-long investigation and evidence collection. The report called the government to adopt its proposed definition of Islamophobia as ‘anti-Muslim racism’.

• **November 2018**: A video showing a Syrian refugee pupil Jamal being tortured by another pupil was posted online, generating an online campaign to support and relocate him to another part of the country. It transpired that Jamal has been serially bullied in his school and had reached out to authorities for protection but nothing was done ahead of the incident shown on the video.

• **09.12.2018**: An arson attack was carried out against Al-Falah Masjid Islamic Centre in Cheetham Hill, Manchester.